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TRIPS-Natural Rights and a "Polite
Form of Economic Imperialism"
A. Samuel Oddi

*

ABSTRACT

This Article discusses the current predominance of
naturalrights theory in the areaof intellectual property and of
patents in particular. Due to the alleged problems of
international theft and pirating of patents, the recent GATT
negotiations saw intellectual property law come to center
stage in the debate over trade. These negotiations concluded
that trade-relatedaspects of intellectual property law can no
longer be left to the public policy of individual countries, but
require new internationalminimum standards.
The author discusses how the basic principles of natural
rights theory have been used to convince the world
community to move toward a universal world standard of
Intellectual property law. By using the concept of natural
rights, all countries must thus recognize the naturalproperty
rights entitlement of the inventor. Thus, copying an invention
is considered "immoral" by the community of nations and the
rights of the Inventor must be protected by positive law.
However, the author notes that developing countries may not
be as eager as developed nations to accept a natural rights

premise.
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The title of this Article is based on a statement by J.H. Reichman. J.H.
Reichman. IntellectualProperty in International Trade: Opportunitiesand Risks of a
GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 813 (1989). Professor Reichman
attributes this thought to Steven P. Ladas stating: "Imposition of foreign legal
standards on unwilling states in the name of 'harmonization' remains today what
Ladas deemed it in 1975, namely, a polite form of economic imperialism." Id.

(citing 1

STEVEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS:

AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 14-15 (1975)).
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The authorseeks to establish the premise that the patent
portion of TRIPS implements a naturalproperty rights theory
of patents by closely analyzing different TRIPS provisions.
Professor Oddi also discusses how patents and inventors will
be treated under such a theory and the different provisions.
He then attempts to Justify TRIPS independent of natural
rights by analyzing the relevant provisions according to
various economic theories of patents.
Professor Oddi
suggests that economic theories do not clearly support the
natural rights theory of TRIPS. He concludes the Article by
determining the economic results of transforming patents to
universal entitlements as natural rights by focusing on the
dfferent Impacts of such a theory on developed and
developing nations. The author also suggests various
strategies for developing countries to cope with TRIPS.
Finally, Professor Oddi questions whether Implementing
TRIPS is likely to provide the promised economic advantages
to eitherdeveloping or developed nations.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.

INTRODUCTION-THE REALPOLITIK OF NATURAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS ....................................................
NATURAL RIGHTS ASPECTS OF PATENT TRIPS (NRAPTS)
NRAPTS VERSUS ECONOMIC THEORIES ......................

Economic Impact .........................................
Strategies...................................................

417
426
440
441
445
448
450
452
454
455
455
461

CONCLUSION ...........................................................

469

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
IV.

ECONOMIC IMPACT AND STRATEGIES ...........................

A.
B.
V.

Patent-InducedTheory .................................
Rent DissipationTheory ..............................
Race-to-Invent Theory ..................................
ProspectTheory ..........................................
PortableFence Theory .................................
Sum mary ...................................................

1996]

NATURAL RIGHTS
There is in all [people] a demand for the superlative, so much so
that the poor devil who has no other way of reaching it attains it by
getting drunk. It seems to me that this demand is at the bottom of
the philosopher's effort to prove that truth is absolute and of the
jurist's search for criteria of universal validity which [the jurist]
collects under the head of natural law.
Justice Holmes

I

I heartily agree with the Court that 'fraud' is bad, 'piracy' is evil,
and 'stealing' is reprehensible. But in this case ....
Justice Black

I.

2

INTRODUCTION-THE" REALPOLITIK OF NATURAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

As a school of jurisprudential thought, natural law surely is
not at the forefront in the last throes of the twentieth century. a

Yet, in the sometimes scholastic world of intellectual property,4
and of patents in particular, as subsumed into the often dog-eatdog world of international trade, natural rights, presumably

derived from natural law, has become the preeminent theory

(even if in somewhat corrupted or disguised form).5

Principal

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1918).
1.
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 612
2.
(1950) (Black, J.. dissenting).
"The natural-law tradition is not one that has generated much
3.
enthusiasm in the contemporary world outside of Roman Catholic circles."
GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 78 (1973). As put by Professor Cohen:
To defend a doctrine of natural rights today, requires either insensitivity to
the world's progress or else considerable courage in the face of it.
Whether all doctrines of natural rights of [humanity] died with the French
Revolution or were killed by historical learning of the 19th century,
everyone who enjoys the consciousness of being enlightened knows that
they are, and by rights ought to be. dead. The attempt to defend a
doctrine of natural rights before historians and political scientists would
be treated very much like an attempt to defend the belief in witchcraft.
M.R. COHEN, REASON AND NATURE 401 (1931), reprinted In PHILIP SHUCKMAN, COHEN
AND COHEN'S READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 565 (1979). M.R.
Cohen is described as "[a U.S.) naturalist philosopher." Id. at 81.
Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 188 (1980)
4.
("[u]nder the sometimes scholastic law of patents . . ." ). As stated by Justice
Story in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901),
"Patents and copyrights approach nearer than any other class of cases belonging
to forensic discussions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where
the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtle and refined, and, sometimes,
almost evanescent."
It is true, for example, that the various natural-rights theories did find
5.
their roots in the natural-law tradition and it is true that those who, at various
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attention is given here to patents because of their perceived
changes in the
importance in international trade and the radical
6
international patent system affected by TRIPS.
Until TRIPS, the prevailing theory of patents, at both the
national and international levels, seemed to be essentially an
instrumentalist form of "reward" theory. 7 The state offers a
reward in the form of a time-limited monopoly to induce inventors
The underlying instrumentalist premise Is that,
to invent.
without the inducement of the monopoly award, an inadequate
number of inventions would be created, to the detriment of

times, have been opposed to legal, social, or economic change have often tried to
support their positions by reference to a natural law. But, there is no necessary
connection between what can legitimately be called the natural-law tradition and
the natural-rights theories and certainly none between this tradition and political
conservatism. CHRISTIE, supra note 3, at 78. "Those who invoke natural law for

judicial creation of supra-constitutional rights can hardly insist that natural law
Is to be distinguished from natural rights." Raoul Berger, Activist Censures of
Robert Bork, 85 NW. U. L. REv. 993. 1020 (1991). See Infra text accompanying
notes 76-81 (discussing the rhetorical use and ambiguity in the Jurisprudential
basis for TRIPS).
6.
This Article will explore whether harmonization under the TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS) imposes the same
form ofpoliteness. As used herein, "Patent TRIPS" refers to Section 5 (Articles 2734). See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994 [hereinafter Final Act]. reprintedIn THE RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS 2-

3 (GATT Secretariat ed., 1994) [hereinafter RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND];
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], Apr. 15, 1994, Annex IC: Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement],
reprinted In RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra, at 6-19, 365-403. For U.S.
congressional approval, see Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103465, §§ 101-103, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) [hereinafter URAAI (authorizing the
President to accept the Uruguay Round Agreements and implement the WTO
Agreement, but denying treaty status and domestic legal effect to the Uruguay
Round Agreements as such, and excluding private actions under those

agreements).
7.
The instrumental form of reward theory should be distinguished from a
natural-law-based reward theory. For a consideration of the latter form, see
EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 21-31
(1951); FRITZ MACHLUP, SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 21

(Comm. Print 1958) [hereinafter MACHLUP]. The reward theory has also been
applied as an economic theory. See WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST
LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 15-32 (1973) and Infra text accompanying
notes 50-65. The term "instrumentalist" is used herein in the broad sense, rather
than being limited to a strict utilitarian sense. See ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY AND
PoLITICAL THEORY 7 (1984) [hereinafter RYAN, PROPERTY & POLITICAL THEORY]. "[A]
strict utilitarian would, in principle, though less certainly in practice, be relatively
deaf to questions about justice or fairness." Id. at 8.
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society.8 This general theory dates at least from the first general
patent statute of the Venetian Republic in 1474:
We have among us [people) of great genius, apt to invent and
discover ingenious devices; and in view of the grandeur and virtue
of our City, more such [people] come to us every day from divers
parts. Now, if provision were made for the works and devices
discovered by such persons, so that others who may see them
could not build them and take the inventor's honor away, more
[people] would then apply their genius, would discover, and would
9
build devices of great utility and benefit to our Commonwealth.

Accordingly, the reward of exclusivity is offered as the inducement
to invent. There is, nonetheless, a hint of a "natural," or at least
a "personal," right in the idea that copiers would take away the
"inventor's honor."
Monopolies, in general, fell upon hard times due to the
The Statute of
abuses of the Tudor kings in England.' 0

8.

Professor Turner questions both aspects of the premise:

The basic rationale of the patent system can be simply put. The
economic case rests upon two propositions: first, that we should have
more invention and innovation than our economic system would provide
in the absence of special inducement; and second, that the granting of a
statutory monopoly to inventors for a period of years is the best method of
providing such special inducement. In addition to the economic case,
there is a rather widespread view, which is essentially a moral argument,

that the creator or discoverer of new and useful knowledge is rightfully
entitled to the economic value to society of what he [or she] has done, and

that it is unfair and inequitable for others to profit from the use of this
knowledge without appropriately rewarding the inventor.
None of these propositions is entirely free from doubt, and two of
them-that the patent system is the best form of inducement to more
invention and innovation, and that it is morally well founded-are highly
questionable.
Donald F. Turner. The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV.
450, 450-51 (1969). See also Paul A. David, Intellectual Property Institutions and
the Panda's Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory
and History, In OFFICE OF INT'L AFF. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 21 (Mitchel B.

Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter GLOBAL DIMENSIONS] (raising the
unanswered empirical questions of whether the faster growth of scientific and
technological knowledge is always a "good thing" and whether the creation of
socially needed inventions Is responsive to economic incentives).
Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550). 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
9.
166, 176-77 (1948) (translated by F.D. Prager from Giulio Mandich, Le Privative
IndustrlallVenezlane (1450-1550), 34 RIvOSTA Di DIRiTTO COMMERCIALE 511 (1936)).
See 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS § 6 (1890) (explaining
10.
Queen Elizabeth rs use of monopolies for personal and political reasons). By the
end of her reign, monopolists controlled the market for staples, such as, salt,
iron, powder, vinegar, bottles, saltpeter, oil, starch, and paper, with
corresponding monopolistic pricing. Id. See also 1 ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB
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Monopolies of 1623 barred monopolies solely from the "buying,
selling, making, working or using of any thing within this

realm.""

However, patents for inventions, which were excluded,

could be granted for fourteen years or less for the exclusive
working or making of inventions within the realm. 12 The need to
exempt patents for inventions from the general prohibition of
monopolies clearly undercuts any natural right of exclusivity for
inventors in their inventions.13
Monopolies were hardly favorites of the United States
Founding Fathers. 14 Thomas Jefferson originally urged that the
Bill
of Rights
proscribe monopolies,
including
limited
monopolies.' 5 After the drafting of the Bill of Rights, however,
Jefferson agreed that time-limited monopolies for literature and
16
inventions would be desirable in a constitutional provision.
Summarizing Jefferson's views, the Supreme Court in Graham v.
John Deere Co. stated:
He rejected a natural rights theory in intellectual property rights
and clearly recognized the social and economic rationale of the
patent system. The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to
the inventorls] ... natural right[s] in [their] discoveries. Rather
It
17
was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.

As finally ratified in the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, section
8, clause 8 grants Congress the power "to promote the progress of
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries." As patents were to be granted for
limited times in order to promote the "useful Arts," there is no

III, LIPSCOMB'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:2 (3d ed. 1984) (describing early common
law monopolies in England); Edward C. Walterscheld, To Promote the Progress of
Science and the Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property
Clause of the United States Constituton. 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1994) (discussing
United States opposition to the English monopoly theory and practice).
11.
An Act Concerning Monopolies and Dispensations of Penal Laws, and
the Forfeitures Thereof, 1623, 21 Jam. 1, ch. 3, § I (Eng.).
12.
Id. § VI.
13.
Indeed, patent monopolies were in derogation of the common law,
monopolies having been held illegal. See Darcy v. Allen (The Case of Monopolies),
72 Eng. Rep. 830 (1602). See also ROBINSON, supra note 10, §§ 9, 12.
14.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1965) (noting that Jefferson
and other notable U.S. citizens abhorred monopolies).
15.
Id. at 7-8. "ITlhe benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to
be opposed to that of their general suppression." V THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 47 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895).
16.
Jefferson moderated his views and approved of monopolies for
literature and inventions. Id. at 113. Jefferson made it clear that such a grant
was in the nature of a privilege and not a natural right. Graham, 383 U.S. at 8
n.2.
17.
383 U.S. at 8-9.
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indication of an inventor's natural right to a patent, but rather
patents are to be granted as a privilege according to congressional
18
enactment for the indicated instrumentalist purpose.

In the "age of enlightenment," practically contemporaneous
with the constitutional deliberations in the United States, a
distinct theory of intellectual property rights was evolving in
France. 19 With evident revolutionary zeal, intellectual creations
were declared to be among the "rights of man."20 Indeed, the
preamble of the French Patent Act 1791 provides:
Every novel idea whose realization
useful to society belongs primarily to
would be a violation of the rights
essence if an industrial invention
21
property of its creator.

or development can become
[the person] who conceived, it
of [humanity] in their very
were not regarded as the

Nonetheless, this "right of man" as an "entitlement" of the
inventor was time limited and carried with it a "natural duty" to
work the invention in France in order to maintain its
exclusivity.22 Moreover, it was not only inventors who could
share in this "natural right" but also those who imported an
23
invention into France.
In the nineteenth century, a number of countries enacted
patent statutes, apparently based on an instrumentalist
philosophy. 2 4 Some anti-patent sentiment, however, did arise

18.
"Innovation, advancement and things which add to the sum of useful
knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional
command must 'promote the progress of... useful Arts.' This is ,the standard
expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored." Id. at 6.
19.
"[Wihat we now see in the world, from the revolutions of [the United
States] and France, are a renovation of the natural order of things, a system of
principles as universal as truth and the existence of [humanity], and combining
moral with political happiness and national prosperity." THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF
MAN 118 (1987).
20.
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN, art. 11 (1789),
reprintedin RETT R. LUDWIKOWSKI & WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., THE BEGINNING OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ERA 225 (1993). This article of the Declaration was adopted by
the National Assembly during the French Revolution on August 26, 1789, and
reaffirmed by the Constitution of 1958. Id.
21.
2 Lois & Actes du Government (1790-91), reprinted in part and
translated in Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property From 1545-1787.
26 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y. 711, 756-57 (1944) [hereinafter Lois &Actes].
22.
Id. § 16 (working required within two years except for good reason).
23.
Id. § 3 (-The first person to import a foreign discovery into France shall
enjoy the same advantages as if [that person] were the inventor thereof.").
24.
See 1 STEVEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 7 n.27 (1975) (listing countries adopting
patent legislation during the 19th century).
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25
later in the century, primarily at the instance of economists.
For example, the Netherlands repealed its patent statute in 1869
and did not reenact one until 1910, which hardly reflects any
26
natural rights sentiment.
The end of the nineteenth century also saw the establishment
of an international patent regime under the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 (Paris Convention or
Convention). 2 7 This Convention adopted a minimalist approach
imposing very few requirements on its members-the two basic
ones being national treatment 28 and a right of priority 29 to
encourage the early disclosure of foreign inventions.
According to national treatment, the only requirement on a
member of the Paris Union is that foreigners must be treated like
nationals. 30 Each member state is thus free to establish the
formal and substantive provisions of its domestic patent regime,
including protectable subject matter, conditions for protection,
and scope and duration of protection. 3 1 National treatment is the
antithesis of a natural right. Can it be said that an inventor has
a natural right to patent protection in one country yet that
invention is free for the taking in another, while both are in full
compliance with the Paris Convention? Do inventors of whatever
nationality have an entitlement as a natural right in the country
that protects, but none, not even a privilege, in nonprotecting
countries? The closest the Paris Convention seems to come to

25.
See PENROSE, supra note 7, at 12-17 (1973) (discussing 19th century
patent controversy). See generally Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent
Controversy In the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIsT. 1 (1950).
26.
PENROSE, supra note 7, at 15. It is interesting to note that neither the
Netherlands nor Switzerland had patent statutes, while being original signatories
and adherents to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
Mar. 20, 1883. as last revised, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305
[hereinafter Paris Convention]. Even when Switzerland enacted a patent statute
in 1888, it excluded processes. PENROSE, supra note 7, at 16, 123-24. See also,
ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS (1971).
27.
Paris Convention, supra note 26.
28.
Id. art. 2.
29.
Id. art. 4 (providing a priority period of 12 months with respect to
application for utility patents).
30.
Id. art. 2,
1 ("Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards
to the protection of industrial property, enjoy in all the other countries of the
Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or may hereafter
grant, to nationals... ").
31.
It should be noted that the Paris Convention does impose some
limitations on members with respect to requirements for grant of priority (art. 4);
independence of patents (art. 4bis); grant of compulsory licenses and forfeitures
(art. 5). Id. arts. 4, 4bis, 5.
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the right to be named as
any form of natural or personal right is
32
itself.
document
patent
the
inventor in
In sum, there seems very little that could reasonably be
33
categorized as a natural right in intellectual property law,
particularly with reference to patents at both the national and
into the
international levels, until this theory was introduced
3 4
century.
twentieth
late
the
in
GATT
of
Uruguay Round
The political and economic motivations for TRIPS have been
admirably documented elsewhere, 3 5 but may be briefly

Article 4ter of the Paris Convention provides: "The inventor shall have
32.
the right to be mentioned as such in the patent." Id. art. 4ter. This provision,
however, did not appear in the original 1883 version, being added at the London
Moreover, the inventors can waive their rights, which
Conference in 1934.
undercuts any status even as a personal right. See G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE
TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL

PROPERTY 24 (1969).

33.

If there is any long-lasting legal incident of the "rights of man" in

intellectual property law, it would appear to be the continued adherence to "moral
rights" in copyright law. The United States, however, has shown little enthusiasm
for such a doctrine, even after finally adhering in 1988 to the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised
July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berme Convention]. References
herein will be to the Paris text. See Id. art. 6bis (Moral Rights). See generally 2
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.02 (1995)
(discussing moral rights under U.S. law).
See generally Final Act. supra note 6; THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A
34.
NEGOTIATING HISTORY Ch. 2 (1995) (discussing Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights) [hereinafter NEGOTIATING HISTORY].
The literature is extensive. See generally NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra
35.
note 34 (overall negotiating background of the Uruguay Round). Two excellent
symposia deal with the early history of TRIPS: Symposium, Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral
Framework, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223-384 (Pt.I), 689-922 (Pt.II) (1989); see,
in particular, R. Michael Gadbaw, Intellectual Property and International Trade:
Merger or Marriageof Convenience?, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223 (1989); Carlos
Alberto Primo Braga. The Economics of Intellectual PropertyRights and the GATT: A
View from the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243 (1989); Robert W. Kastenmeier
& David Beier, International Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and
Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285 (1989); Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First
World Assets In the Third World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT
Multilateral Framework. 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1989); William M. Walker,
Uruguay Round TRIPS: A Bibliographic Essay, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 911
(1989); J. H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in InternationalTrade: Opportunities
and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747 (1989) (hereinafter
Reichman, GAIT Connection); GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker
eds., 1989). For a European viewpoint, see Hans Peter Hunz-Hallstein, The U.S.
Proposalfor a GATT-Agreement on IntellectualProperty and the Parts Conventionfor
the Protection of Intellectual Property, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265; Wolfgang
Fikentscher, GATT Prlnclples and Intellectual Property Protection, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 99 (1989); Harms Ullrich. GATT: Industrial Property Protection, Fair
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summarized: Industry groups (lobbyists) in developed countries,
particularly in the United States, found a receptive government
ear to their plea that their intellectual property was being
"counterfeited," "pirated," "stolen," and "infringed" to their
detriment and to the detriment of intellectual property-exporting
countries by a generally bad lot in certain countries.3 6 Moreover,

Trade and Development, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 127 (1989).
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE:

See generally

STRENGTHENING WORLDWIDE

PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1987) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]
(describing the administration's use of multilateral and bilateral negotiations with
respect to "problem" countries); UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,
FOREIGN PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EFFECT ON U.S.

INDUSTRY AND TRADE (1988) (study estimating loss to U.S. industries due to
inadequate intellectual property protection in foreign countries); EDWARD SLAVKO
YAMBRUSIC, TRADE RELATED APPROACHES TO THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (1992).
36.
See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 9:
Intellectual property pirates are often in a better position than legitimate
producers to satisfy demand in newly industrialized countries since they
generally enjoy lower production costs. Because pirates merely copy
products rather than developing their own, their design and/or research
and development costs are often minimal. They pay no royalties to those
who originally developed the intellectual property. Advertising and market
development costs are not key concerns as their markets are largely
created for them by the efforts and at the expense of companies selling
authentic products. Moreover, because they copy only products with
proven market success, pirates escape the cost of developing products
that turn out to be market failures.
See also Gadbaw, supranote 35, at 233:
If these [intellectual] assets are as vulnerable to plunder as the slowmoving merchant ships of the 1700s were to the Barbary pirates, the
United States ability to trade with countries that harbor such pirates could
be seriously hampered. Harm to United States interests is exacerbated
when the pirates can turn around and exploit their bounty by reproducing
it for sale in domestic and foreign markets as though it were their own,
thereby further damaging the export potential of United States industry.
See also Clayton Yeutter, Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights Protection, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE NEXT DECADE 109,

112 (Charles E. Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield eds., 1988):
If any country, whether it be a developing country or a developed country,
has to depend upon the piracy of intellectual property in order to hold
down consumer costs, whether it be food or drugs or whatever, that is an
indefensible way to run any society. I don't see how any nation in the
world can defend piracy in the context of preservation of low consumer

costs for food or drugs or anything else. So we need to deal with It
wherever the problem may be.
If a rhetorical question could be permitted with regard to Mr. Yeutter's statement
made while he was U.S. Trade Representative, would a country be justified in
using slave, child, or prison labor to keep costs down as long as no "piracy" was
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they were
able
to
convince
their governments
that
anticounterfeiting measures on an international level were not
enough. The real problem was that many of the countries that
condemned such "illegal" conduct failed to provide adequate
37
intelectual property protection.

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which
presumably

had

jurisdiction

over

international

intellectual

property matters, was incapable or unwilling to deal with the
This
problem of inadequate intellectual property protection.3 8
inability was supposedly the result of the block power exerted by
developing countries in WIPO and the tension between developed
and developing countries, which had resulted in a stalemate3 9in
the revision of the Paris Convention over the past two decades.
An anticounterfeiting code had been introduced at the end of
40
the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations, but it was not adopted.
GATT provided a much more commodious venue for developed
countries. They could use the leverage of trade and access to
their markets against developing countries rather than merely
41
dealing with the minutiae of intellectual property.

involved? See also Reichman. GATT Connection, supra note 35, at 775-800
(discussing the broad and rhetorical use of "piracy" and "infringement").
See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 35:
37.
In its April 1986 policy statement, the administration outlined two
(1) complete and implement an
proposals for GATT action:
"anticounterfeiting" code aimed at eliminating market access for imported
goods that counterfeit or infringe trademarks and (2) conclude an
enforceable agreement against trade distorting practices arising from
inadequate protection of intellectual property rights.
38.
WIPO initially seemed to lack interest in the forum dispute and was
evidently willing to concede jurisdiction to GATT. WIPO was reported as stating
that "it has neither the funds nor the mandate from its members to consider the
issue." GATT Expert Group Ready to Draft Report but IndustrialNations, LDCs Still
Split, 2 INT'L TRADE REP. 934, 934 (1985). See also Monique L. Cordray, GATT v.
WiPO, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 121, 141 (1994). As summarized by

Professor Merges:

"From the perspective of those concerned with enhanced

protection, an increasingly lethargic and bureaucratized WIPO forced these issues
into GAIT, relevant or not." Robert P. Merges, Battle of Lateraltsms: Intellectual
Propertyand Trade, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 239, 240 (1990).
39.
See GAO REPORT. supra note 35, at 26 (developing countries wanted
the authority to grant exclusive compulsory licenses, to permit forfeiture before
granting compulsory licenses, and to grant compulsory license to forfeit within
shorter time periods).
40.
See NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 34, at 2259-60.
41.
See GAO REPORT. supra note 35, at 36-37.
Greater progress may be attainable in GATT then in WIPO for two reasons.
First, GATT has a more fluid mechanism for adopting new measures; the
members of GATT have not formed voting blocs, largely because of their
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Through this strategic maneuver of shifting from foundering
WIPO to accommodating GATT, intellectual property somehow
fundamentally acquired trade-related aspects. 4 2 Furthermore,
these newly discovered trade-related aspects were of such
importance that they could not be left to the public policy of
individual countries but had to be imposed as international
minimum standards.
Indeed, certain of these trade-related
aspects directed to patents were deemed of such paramount
importance that they seemed to have acquired natural rights
43
aspects.
This Article first seeks to establish the premise that the
patent portion of TRIPS implements, in significant provisions, a
natural property rights theory of patents. Next, in an attempt to
determine if any or all of these theories justify such provisions
independent of natural rights, the author will analyze these
relevant provisions according to various economic theories of
patents.
Then, an attempt will be made to determine the
economic impact effected by the transformation of patents from
domestic privileges to universal entitlements as natural rights.
Finally, some strategies will be suggested to deal with that
impact, particularly with respect to developing countries and least
developed countries (LDCs).
II. NATURAL RIGHTS ASPECTS OF PATENT TRIPS (NRAPTS)

In contradistinction to being based upon positive
law---constitutional or statutory-natural rights, being an
entitlement of personhood or rationally following from higher

varying economic interests in the many aspects of trade subject to GATT

negotiation. Most GATT non-tariff barrier obligations are embodied in
.codes" to which adherence is optional. . . . Second, GATT dispute
settlement procedures, while viewed as needing considerable
improvement, are generally considered better than those in WIPO....
Id. (footnote omitted).
42.
While always having relevance to international trade, intellectual
property was now seen as transcending the territorial jurisdiction of countries as
a necessary aspect of trade relations among countries.
43.
Such natural right aspects of patent TRIPS will be identified and
analyzed infra text accompanying notes 82-106. Both the instrumentalist and
natural right theories are based on Western philosophy. It may be instructive to
compare Eastern philosophy concerning intellectual creations. See, in particular,
Professor Alford's works:

WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK Is AN ELEGANT

OFFENCE (1995), and William P. Alford, How Theory Does-and Does Not-Matter:
American Approaches to Intellectual Property in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J.
8 (1994).

NATURAL RIGHTS
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principles, devolve from a higher source. 44
The Rights of Man, Thomas Paine stated:
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In his famous book,

Natural rights are those which always appertain to [human beings]

in right of [their] existence. Of this kind are all the intellectual
rights, rights of the mind, and also all those rights of acting as
individualts] of [their] own comfort
and happiness, which are not
45
injurious to the rights of others.

Pervading any discussion of the nature or philosophy of property
is the tension between property as an entitlement, a natural right,
and property as a privilege or a creation of positive law serving
instrumentalist goals.4 6 The tension is heightened when natural
rights are extended beyond tangible property to intangibles,
47
including ideas, inventions, or expression.
Generally two lines of reasoning have been offered as naturalrights justifications for patents. One is the "first occupancy"
thesis: The person who discovers or creates an invention should
be entitled morally to its exclusive use. 4 8 This appears to be the
approach of the "rights of man" implemented in the French Patent
Act of 1791.49 The other thesis is a "labor" justification for
natural rights treatment. It is based on the principle that the
person who expends labor in creating intellectual property-an
50
invention-should be morally entitled to the fruits of that labor.
This is a Lockean approach based upon the premise that labor is
unpleasant, and those who engage in it deserve, in justice, to be
rewarded. 5 ' There is, however, an instrumentalist aspect to this

44.
See ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY 61 (1987) ("The traditional theory of natural
rights (insofar as it was one entity) characteristically derived individual rights

from the lawv of God, or Nature or Reason.").
45.
PAiNE, supra note 19. at 43.
46.
See RYAN, supra note 44, at 53. Professor Robinson consistently refers
to the "patent privilege." See 1 ROBINSON, supra note 10, §§ 11-44.
47.
Intellectual creations are different from tangible property in that they
are inexhaustible and, in this sense are "free goods." In addition, they are "public
goods," where upon disclosure they are subject to use and replication unless

otherwise protected. See GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8. at 24-28 (discussing

the "public good" nature of information). See also Steven Cherensky, Comment, A
Penny for

Their Thoughts:

Employee-Inventors,

Prelnventlon Assignment

Agreements, Property, and Personhood,81 CAL. L. REV. 595, 627-28, n.147 (1993)

(discussing various property theories of patents in the context of employment

agreements).
48.

(1977).
49.
50.
51.

LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 24-30

See Lots & Actes, supra note 21.
BECKER,supra note 48, at 32-56.
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 16-30 (Thomas P.

Peardon ed., 1952). The other labor thesis of Locke is that, as one has property
rights in one's body, a right would also extend to the product of that body's labor.
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theory, in that society should want to provide rewards to induce
52
individuals to engage in distasteful but socially beneficial labor.
Either of these theories seems to justify a "natural right" in
inventors to their own inventions. 53 This scope of natural right in
an invention is of a nonexclusive nature, and thus may be

considered a "weak form" of natural right. 54 Inventors would be
entitled to maintain their inventions in secrecy or to exploit their
inventions publicly, albeit in a nonexclusive manner, provided
there is no preclusion by positive law.5 5

Even presuming the

patent system should be
abolished, this weak form of natural
55
right would still persist.
Extending the first occupancy or labor theories or a
combination of them to grant to inventors exclusivity in their
inventions, as a natural right, appears to require further
justification. Exclusivity for inventions Is obtained only by means
of a positive law enactment creating a patent system, and then
only by satisfying the formal and substantive conditions
mandated by the system for the grant of a patent.57 The
argument can be made that a patent statute merely codifies the

Id. See John Christman, Can OwnershipBe Justified by Natural RIghts, 15 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 156, 159-64 (1986) (discussing Locke's labor theories).
52.
At least to the extent that society is benefited by the labor as compared
to being damaged (e.g., by pollution or over-exploitation).
53.
As stated by Professor Robinson: "In order, therefore, to retain
exclusive ownership of [the] idea, [the inventor] must withhold its material
embodiment from observation; and as long as [the inventor] can do this, the
invention is as truly his [or hers] by natural right as if it never had been thus
externally expressed." ROBINSON, supra note 10, at 38 (footnote omitted).
54.
This usage as non-exclusivity being the "weak form" and "exclusivity"
being the "strong form" is to be distinguished from Professor Christman's usage.
He considered the "strong sense" of natural right to be that which persons would
possess in a state of nature and the "weak sense" to be that not imposed by
humanity. See Chrlstman, supra note 51, at 157-58.
55.
A primary form of exclusion would be the grant of a patent on the
same invention to another. Other types of supervening positive law provisions
would include those for safety, environmental protection, etc. Nevertheless,
inventors might even be able to enjoy the best of both worlds by publicly
exploiting inventions that are not self-disclosing of any trade secrets and that
would require extensive reverse engineering to discover.
56.
It may be argued that this weak form of natural right protection of
invention would in itself be adequate to create an adequate number of inventions.
Inventions would still, of course, be made whether or not patents arc available.
Competition in the marketplace may provide an adequate incentive for providing a
sufficient number of inventions. See Infra text accompanying notes 108-22
(discussing the patent-induced theory).
57.
Patent protection may be contrasted with copyrights where protection
in the United States and most countries of the world subsists by fixing an original
work in a tangible medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C. 9 102(a) (1994).
Moreover, as mandated by the Berne Convention, supra note 33. art. 5(2), no
formalities may be required for such protection.
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natural right of inventors in their inventions and, hence,
recognizes that right in its "strong form," entailing exclusivity.5 8
The argument then would run: as exclusivity is the essential
attribute of property, treating inventions as property is the
necessary natural right entitlement justified by bringing the
invention to fruition. 5 9
If, then, a patent system is based on natural rights theory,
what should rationally follow as characteristics of such a system?
A fundamental characteristic would appear to be universality,
protecting all forms of inventions everywhere. Thus the system

should protect all forms of inventions as broadly as possible

within the full spectrum of ideas-from general to specific

implementations. 6 0 In theory, the subject matter of protection
should be as expansive as possible so as not to exclude any

inventive creation of the mind.
Universality would also require that there should be no
limitation as to the duration of exclusivity. 6 1 If there is a natural
property right to a patent, there would seem to be no justification

58.

Such could be said of the French Patent Act of 1791. See Lots & Actes,

supra note 21.

See also YVES PLASSERAUD & FRANcoIs SAVIGNON, L'ETAT ET

L'INVENTION: HISTOIRE DES BREvETs 46-48 (1986).
The Supreme Court early identified the difference between the "weak" and the
"strong" versions of the right: "It is the fact that the patentee has invented or
discovered something useful and thus has the common-law right to make, use,
and vend it...
which induces the government to clothe [the patentee] with power
to exclude everyone else from making, using, or vending it." Crown Die & Tool
Co. v. NYE Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 36 (1923). This recognition, of
course, does not ordain that the grant of a patent "naturally" follows from the
"common law" right.
59.
Compare the economic argument that so treating inventions results in
efficiency, especially with respect to transferability and transaction costs. See
RICHARD A. POSNER. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 3.1 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS] ("The creation of exclusive rights is a necessary
rather than a sufficient condition for the efficient use of resources: The rights
must be transferable.").
60.
Arthur Kuflik, Moral Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, in
OWNING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION 219, 225 (Vivian Weil & John W.

Snapper eds., 1989) ("What is needed is a coherent account of why, even though
people have such a right. it applies only to certain products of their mental
activity-specific inventions, particular works of authorship-rather than to all
such mental products.").
61.
See PENROSE, supra note 7, at 24 (footnote omitted) ("[If the patent
grant is justified on grounds of natural property, there is no more logical or moral
Justification for limiting in time than in space.").
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62
for making it time limited except on instrumentalist grounds.6 3
Tangible property does not expire, although it may be expended.
Another aspect of the universal nature of the right is that It
should not be territorially limited because it does not arise from
the positive law of a given sovereign but rather from a higher
order. 64 Moreover, the arbitrary happenstance of where the
invention was created, the nationality of the inventor, or the
countries where patent protection is available should not affect
the recognition of the natural right.6 5
Finally, if the patent right is an entitlement, then the reward
granted should be commensurate with the invention's
principal incident of property,
contribution. 6 6 Exclusivity, as the
67
is expected to achieve this result.
The failure of actual patent systems to satisfy these idealized
characteristics of a natural-rights-based system has been the
principle criticism of this theory. Actual patent systems are not
universal. They are limited by territory, subject matter, and
duration, among others. 68 Finally, there seems to be little
of an inventor and the
correlation between the contribution
69
reward to the patent owner.

62.
term).

See Infra note 106 (citing studies on the economic value of the patent

See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Law of Property and Recent Juristic
63.
Thought, 25 A.B.A. J. 993, 997 (1939):
According to the civilians, property involves six rights: aJus possidendl or
right of possessing, a right in the strict sense; ajus prohlbendl or right of
excluding others, also a right in the strict sense; aJus dsponendl or right
of disposition, what we should now call a legal power; aJus utendi or right
of using, what we should now call a liberty; a Jus fruendi or right of
enjoying the fruits and profits; and aJus abutendi or right of destroying or
injuring if one likes-the two last also what today we should call liberties.
Article 1, § 8, cl. 8 of the U.S. Constitution, of course, imposes the requirement
that copyrights and patents be time limited.
64.
See RYAN, supra note 44.
65.
A country could grant patents only to native-born citizens with respect
only to inventions made within the country and exclude a wide variety of
technology from protection. See Infra note 89 (citing the exclusions of various

categories of inventions).
66.

See Kuflik, supra note 60, at 231-32.

67.

There are, of course, other inducements that may provide an adequate

number of inventions at a lower cost to society (e.g., prizes, awards, subsidies).
But see infra note 69.
68.
In addition to novelty and utility (industrial application) requirements,
inventions are subjected to a quality standard expressed In terms of
nonobvlousness or involving an inventive step. See Infra note 89 (quoting the
patent TRIPS art. 27(1) requirements).
69.
See PENROSE, supra note 7. at 30-31 ("One man may spend his life
developing a great idea for which society is not ready: another may perfect a
bright idea in an evening for a clever gadget which society Is willing to buy in large
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Aside from these criticisms is the difficulty of justifying a
natural rights theory when there is an independent creation of
the same invention. 70 If a patent right is a natural right, how can
it be appropriated exclusively by the first applicant or the first
inventor to file, thus depriving other independent inventors of
In addition, no invention is truly
their natural rights? 7 1
independent. All rely upon the past intellectual contributions
forming the whole body of prior art. The concept of "standing on
73
72
or even of "ordinary mechanics,"
the shoulders of giants,"
supplies a justification for a natural right to copy, at least in the
"weak form" (i.e., unless proscribed by positive law).7 4

quantities and pay millions of dollars for."). In a generalized property context, see
RYAN, PROPERTY & POLITIcAL THEORY, supra note 7, at 91 ("Although utilitarianism
is inhospitable to the concept of desert, the fact that utilitarian accounts of
property rights so often invoke arguments about the incentive to labour makes it

embarrassingly hard to overlook the way in which those who work hardest

generally receive least."). Cf. GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8. at 32 ("[TIhe
avoidance of administrative arbitrariness in awarding prizes or granting subsidies
for invention has been recognized as an advantage of the patent system by
economists since Adam Smith.").
Kuflik. supranote 60, at 226.
70.
While it may be argued that awarding the patent to the first Inventor is
71.
somewhat less arbitrary than awarding it to the one who wins the race to the
patent office, it still does not resolve the contradiction of only one inventor's
winning the lottery of the natural rights.
See ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN
72.
PosTScRIPT (1967) (considering the history of the phrase, often attributed to Isaac
Newton); see also Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:
Cumulative Research and the PatentLaw, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
In the context of weeding out inventions worthy of patent protection
73.
from those unworthy, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1965) (referring to Hotchktss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.)
248 (1850)): "Hotchklss by positing the condition that a patentable invention
evidence more ingenuity and skill than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic
acquainted with the business, merely distinguished between new and useful
innovations that were capable of sustaining a patent and those that were not."
Professor Robinson considers there to be a balance between natural
74.
rights and correlative natural duties:
The natural right of the public to appropriate all new ideas that may be
voluntarily disclosed is no less evident than that of the inventor to conceal
them. It is a law of nature that [people] should profit by the discoveries
and inventions of each other. This is the law which binds society together,
and in obedience to which lies all the possibility of moral, intellectual, and
To benefit by the discoveries of [others] is
material advancement ....
thus not only a natural right. it is also the natural duty which every
[person] owes to [the self] and to society; and the mutual, universal
progress thence resulting is the fulfillment of the earthly destiny of the
human race.
ROBINSON, supra note 10, at 39 (footnotes omitted).
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Whatever may be the merits or failings of the philosophical
underpinnings of a natural rights theory of intellectual property
and of patents in particular, this theory has had great rhetorical
power in convincing the world community to sacrifice country-bycountry traditional instrumentalist control over intellectual
property to a more universal world standard as dictated by TRIPS.
While never quite articulated as such, natural rights theory is
submitted to have played a major rhetorical role in the strategy of
industry groups dominated by multinational corporations (MNCs)
to convince their governments in developed countries to demand
"adequate" protection of intellectual property in the GATT
75
negotiating process.
A basic rhetorical argument, based upon a natural law
premise, is that "theft," and "pirating" and "infringement" occur
any time an invention patented anywhere in the world is copied

anywhere else in the world, including in countries where that

invention was not patented or even not patentable because of that
country's positive law.7 6 This line of argument illustrates that
inventions should be considered as being universal and not
territorially limited. Nonetheless, it is, of course, perfectly legal to
replicate an invention that is in the public domain in a particular
country. 77
Moreover, such copying presumably should be

75.
See Paul C. B. Liu, U.S. Industry's Influence on Intellectual Property
Negotiations and Special 301 Actions, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 87 (1994).
76.
See supra note 36. Even if a patent fails to claim a particular
invention, this invention is dedicated to the public and is free for all to copy. If
patent protection is assuaged in lieu of secrecy or there is a failure to file for
whatever reason, with the loss of secrecy, this invention also goes into the public
domain and may be freely copied. The use of this rhetorical argument may be
seen by SmithKline Beecham's complaint against the generic copying of
"Tagamet" in various countries that did not protect pharmaceuticals. SmithKline
alleged a loss of $50 million because of such failure to protect in developing
countries. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 229-30 (1986). See also, Allen S.
Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of IntellectualProperty
Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 89, 136 (1993) (discussing Thailand's use of over
26 generic brands competing at prices as low as $0.35 per daily dose, as opposed
to $1.68 daily for SmithKline's -Tagamet").
77.
A classic example would be Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laltram Corp.,
406 U.S. 518 (1972), in which the Court held that it was not infringement in the
United States to package parts of a shrimp-deveinlng machine patented in the
United States with instructions for assembling the machine and shipping the kit
to Brazil, where it could be assembled within one hour. Id. at 532. There was no

infringement in Brazil because there was no Brazilian counterpart to the U.S.
patent. Thus, the Brazilian purchaser was free to make and use the machine.
Congress has closed this loophole so that the kit assembler in the United States
would now be an infringer of the U.S. patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (1994).
Nonetheless, there still would be no infringement in Brazil by the user of the
invention unless a corresponding Brazilian patent existed. See also supra 76
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encouraged because of the economic efficiencies associated with
free riding of this sort. 78 Certainly, such copying is neither theft
nor piracy nor even infringement in the legal sense. It is only
through the rhetorical construct of natural property rights that
inventions are to be protected universally and that the
"immorality" of copying inventions becomes manifest.
Copying an invention, wherever created and patented,
becomes immoral because it is an incident of a natural property
rights entitlement of the inventor (patent owner). All countries of
the world must recognize this entitlement by means of its positive
law, even though free copying might benefit particular countries.
By accepting the natural rights premise, the basic philosophical
tension between patents as a privilege or as an entitlement
79
appears to be resolved in favor of the latter under patent TRIPS.
Even though the rhetoric may be clear, the jurisprudential
basis for TRIPS is not. For example, the preamble states:
Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to
international trade, and taking into account the need to promote
effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights,
and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual
property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate
trade; ...
Recognizing the underlying public policy objectives of national
systems for the protection of intellectual property, including
development and technological objectives;.. 80

While perhaps leaving something to be desired, even for
international bureaucratic drafting, the message of the
introductory "desiring" clause, that inadequate protection of
(discussing the sale of "Tagamet" in countries not granting patent protection on
pharmaceuticals).
78.
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Crafts Boats, Inc.. 489 U.S. 141. 146
(1989). is instructive on this point: "From their inception, the federal patent laws
have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the
recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to
invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy." In countering
the argument that the Florida statute only prohibited duplication of boat hulls by
means of the "direct molding process," the Court stated:
It is difficult to conceive of a more effective method of creating substantial
property rights in an intellectual creation than to eliminate the most
efficient method for its exploitation. Sears and Compco protect more than

the right of the public to contemplate the abstract beauty of an otherwise
unprotected intellectual creation-they assure its efficient reduction to
practice and sale in the market-place.
Id. at 164.
79.
See supra note 6 (defining "patent TRIPS").
80.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6. pmbl. (emphasis added).
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intellectual property rights may somehow distort and impede
international trade, appears to justify a universalist natural rights
On the other hand, the
theory if the nexus is accepted.
"recognizing" clause acknowledges the instrumental goals of
national intellectual property systems as including "development
and technological objectives."
The objectives stated in Article 12 again imply at least a
qualified instrumentalist view, but on a worldwide basis as
opposed to the national basis in the preamble:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual properly rights
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and
to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and
economic welfare, and to a
in a manner conducive to social8 and
1
balance of rights and obligations.

The qualification, seemingly a natural rights one, is that users of
-technological knowledge" must also recognize their obligation to
protect it.
Two major provisions of patent TRIPS are submitted to
represent primarily a natural rights philosophy, and are singled
out for detailed analysis. 8 2 These collectively will be called
"natural rights aspects of patent TRIPS" (NRAPTS). 8 3 These are
Article 27 (Patentable Subject Matter) and Article 33 (Term of
Protection).
Article 27 provides: "Paragraph 1. Subject to the provisions
of paragraph 2 and 3 below, patents shall be available for any
inventions whether products or processes, in all fields of
Paragraph 2 generally permits the exclusion
technology .. .84

81.
Id. art. 12.
82.
Other provisions of TRIPS may also be seen as having natural rights
aspects. However. within the thesis of this Article. only two of the principal ones
will be analyzed in detail. Other natural rights aspects of TRIPS may be seen in
the subject matter required to be protected (e.g., sound recordings (art. 14) (not
mandatory under the Berne Convention), geographical indications (arts 22-23).
industrial designs (arts. 25-26). semiconductor chip layout (arts. 35-38), trade
secrets (art. 39)). TRIPS. supra note 6.

83.

The qualification of natural rights by aspect is believed appropriate

because of the ambiguous jurisprudential bases for TRIPS.
84. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 below. (adopted by
the National Assembly during the French revolution on August 26. 1789,
and reaffirmed by the Constitution of 1958) patents shall be available for
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology.
provided that they are new. involve an inventive step and are capable of
industrial application. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65. paragraph 8
of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and
patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention,
the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally
produced.
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from patentable subject matter inventions "necessary to protect
ordre public or morality."8 5 Paragraph 3 permits the exclusion of
"diagnostic therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of
humans or animals" and "plants and animals other than
microorganisms, and essentially biological processes for the
production of plants or animals other than non-biological and
microbiological processes." s However, members are required to
protect "patent varieties either by patents or by an effective sui
87
generis system or by any combination thereof."
Aside from these limitations and the requirement that the
invention fall within a field of "technology," members are obligated
to provide patent protection to "any inventions." 8 8 This statutory
subject matter definition certainly goes well beyond that of many

nations which exclude, inter alia, pharmaceuticals, food, and
agricultural chemical products. These exclusions presumably are
based upon instrumental public policy.8 9

Indeed, the scope of

Id. art. 27(1).
85. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention
within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary
to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or
plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment,
provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation
is prohibited by domestic law.
Id. art. 27(2).
Members may also exclude from patentability:
86.
diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for treatment
(a)
of humans or animals;
(b)
plants and animals other than microorganisms, and
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals
However,
other than non-biological and microbiological processes.
Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by
patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination
thereof. The provisions of this sub-paragraph shall be reviewed four years
after the entry into force of the Agreement Establishing the MTO.
Id. art. 27(3).
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
See World Intellectual Property Organization, Existence Scope and
Form of Generally Internationally Accepted and Applied Standards/Norms for the
Protection of Intellectual Property, WO/INF/29 Sept., 1988 GATT Document MTN.
This study finds the
GNG/NG11/W/24/Rev. 1 [hereinafter WIPO Study].

following among the principal exclusions: 49 countries exclude pharmaceutical
products, 10 countries exclude pharmaceutical processes, 45 countries exclude
animal varieties, 44 countries exclude plant varieties. 35 exclude food product,
32 countries exclude computer programs, and 22 countries exclude chemical
products. See also NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 34, at 2273 ("Whereas the
developed countries' texts all supported negotiation of a comprehensive
agreement on [protection of pharmaceuticals], the developing countries viewed
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subject matter of Article 27 may be broader than the "process,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter," which are
categories of Section 101 of the U.S. Patent Statute.90
The broad mandatory subject matter definition of Article 27
more clearly implements a natural rights theory than an
instrumentalist view. Historically, it is difficult to justify an
instrumentalist view of Article 27, because most countries have
had specific exclusions from patentability based upon perceived
public policy.
These countries, of course, could have been
mistaken as to the merits of their public policy, which has now
been clarified by the international community. However, a more
plausible explanation might be that Article 27 implements natural
rights theory to the effect that all inventions, including certain
categories of inventions that have been traditionally excluded
from protection by many countries, are now of such importance to
international trade that they must be protected universally. Their
value transcends perceived national instrumentalist self-interest,
which now must yield to the natural rights entitlement. 9 1
Patent TRIPS may even be seen as creating "supernatural"
property rights in two particular classes of inventions, namely,
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products. In Article 70,
entitled "Protection of Existing Subject Matter," paragraph 8
requires that all members "make available as a date of entry into
the force of the Agreement Establishing the WTO patent
protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products

intellectual property not as a property right, but rather as an instrument of public
policy.").
90.
U.S. courts have found it difficult to fit computer programs into the
process, machine, or manufacture categories. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175 (1981). Relevant decisions of the U.S. federal circuit courts include: In
re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (machine), In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (process); In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (composition
of matter).
91.
Nonetheless, there is jurisprudential ambiguity even within Article
27(1), which, after defining statutory subject matter, defines the substantive
standard for protection mandated for all members: An invention to be patented
must be "new, involve an inventive step and [be] capable of Industrial application.
.." TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 27(1). Footnotes explain that "Inventive step" may
be interpreted as being synonymous with "non-obvious," and "capable of
Industrial application" with "useful." Id. The non-obvious standard indicates that
some new and useful inventions are more meritorious than others. The usual
rationale for this is an instrumentalist one, as articulated in Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966), that the non-obvious standard was devised to
solve the "inherent problem [ofl developling] some means of weeding out those
inventions which would not be disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a
patent." An entitlement view has no need to weed out inventions induced by a
patent system, because protection Is inherent as a natural right independent of
any patent system inducement.
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commensurate with its obligations under Article 27."92 Those
members, including developing countries and LDCs, 9" that do not
must: (1) provide a procedure for accepting applications with
respect to such inventions, (2) examine such inventions according
to the substantive standards of Article 27, and, moreover, (3)
protect such inventions according to the duration set out in
Article 33.94 With respect to all other categories of subject
matter, developing countries and LDCs may delay the operation of
Article 27 for various transitional periods. 95

92. Where a Member does not make available as of the date of entry into
force of the Agreement Establishing the MTO patent protection for
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products commensurate with

its obligations under Article 27, that Member shall:
(i) notwithstanding the provisions of Part VI above, provide
as from the date of entry into force of the Agreement Establishing the
MTO a means by which applications for patents for such inventions
can be filed;
(ii) apply to these applications, as of the date of application
of this Agreement, the criteria for patentability as laid down in this
Agreement as if those criteria were being applied on the date of filing
in that Member or, where priority is available and claimed, the
priority date of the application;
(iii) provide patent protection in accordance with this
Agreement as from the grant of the patent and for the remainder of
the patent term, counted from the filing date in accordance with
Article 33 of this Agreement, for those of these applications that meet
the criteria for protection referred to in sub-paragraph (ii) above.
TRIPS, supra note 6. art. 70(8).
See Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Impact of TRIPS: Intellectual Property
93.
Protection in Developing Countries, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1245, 1255 (1994)
(listing 47 countries as LDCs).
94.
See supra note 84 (quoting substantive requirements); see infra note
100 (quoting duration).
95.
As summarized by Bronckers, supra note 93, at 1252: "The least
developed countries are not obliged to apply the provisions of the TRIPS
agreement in the first eleven years following the entry into force of the WTO."
In the first five years following the entry into force of the WTO [other
developing] countries are not obliged to apply the provisions of the TRIPS

agreement. This is to be compared with the one year transitional period
for developed countries ....

As for the pharmaceutical and agricultural

chemical products, however, an exceptional regime has been established
as described above.
Id. at 1257-58. See also J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of
Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement.
29 INT'L LAW. 345, 353 [hereinafter Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards]
(discussing transitional provisions of TRIPS).
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In addition, under Article 70, paragraph 9, all members must
provide so-called "pipeline" protection 96 for pharmaceutical and
agricultural chemical product inventions in the form of "exclusive
marketing rights."9 7 Such rights are to extend for five years
starting from the date of market approval in that country or until
a patent is granted or rejected, with the proviso that a patent has
been granted in another member and that market approval has
been obtained. 98
The "existing rights" provisions of Article 70 thus make It

clear that some inventions are more equal than others.
Pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical product inventions
presumably are of such importance that immediate protection
must be implemented. Indeed, protection must be provided to
such inventions even when they were created prior to their
protectability under the positive law of certain members. 9 9
Evidently, the GATT community concludes that there are some
preexisting supernatural rights in pharmaceutical
and
agricultural chemical product inventions that all members are
bound to protect, even though this was unrecognized in their
positive law.

96.
"The protection of pharmaceuticals subject to a patent, but not yet
developed or marketed is known as 'pipeline' protection....
The United States
...proposed that the TRIPS agreement provide 'pipeline' protection for patented
drugs which have not been marketed in foreign countries." NEGOTIATING HISTORY,
supra note 34, at 2286, 2298. See also Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards,
supra note 95, at 353 (footnote omitted) ("Nevertheless, a pipeline provision,
clarified at the last minute, safeguards existing pharmaceutical and agrochemical
patents, which, if otherwise eligible, must obtain at least five years of exclusive
marketing rights even in those developing countries that did not previously grant
patents in these fields.").
97.
Reichman, UniversalMinimum Standards,supranote 95, at 353.
98. Where a product is the subject of a patent application in a Member
in accordance with paragraph 8(i) above, exclusive marketing rights shall
be granted, notwithstanding the provisions of Part VI above, for a period of
five years after obtaining market approval in that Member or until a
product patent is granted or rejected in that Member, whichever period Is
shorter, provided that, subsequent to the entry into force of the Agreement
Establishing the MTO, a patent application has been filed and a patent
granted for that product in another Member and marketing approval
obtained in such other Member.
TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 70(9).
99.
For example, an application for a pharmaceutical invention filed on a
member protecting such inventions prior to entering into force of the Agreement
will be entitled to protection under Art. 70(8), in a member that did not provide
such protection at the time of the original filing, and must even give that
application a priority date. It is not apparent when the priority date starts to

run-from the date of original filing, from its date of entry into the Agreement or
otherwise.
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The second provision in patent TRIPS that is submitted to
have a natural rights aspect is Article 33, mandating a uniform
term for all patents of twenty years running from the filing
date. I0 0 Prior to the enactment of this provision, many nations,
including the United States, had a different term of protection.' 0 '
Many countries had shorter terms with respect to all or with
respect to particular classes of inventions.' 0 2 Thus, by virtue of
this provision, individual members are excluded from establishing
the term of protection on an instrumentalist basis according to

the perceived value of a particular class of inventions. All classes
of inventions are to be treated the same for the same period of
time. Hence, by acquiring foreign patents, owners will be assured
of a twenty-year term from the filing date in that country, and will
be able to continue their monopoly position in foreign countries
03
even after expiration of their patents in the originating country.'

This again would appear to be based on the natural rights
theory that all inventions require a minimum duration as an
entitlement, and that the term should be uniform irrespective of
the perceived value of that class of invention to a given nation.
Moreover, by extending the patent term, the value of the
entitlement is accordingly increased.' 0 4
This extension will

100. "The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of
a period of twenty years counted from the filing date." TRIPS, supra note 6. art.
33 (footnote omitted).
101. The 17-year term from grant for U.S. patents began under the Patent
Act of 1861. This term superseded that of the Patent Act of 1836, which provided
for a 14-year term from grant with the possibility of a 7-year renewal term. The
first Patent Act of 1790 and that of 1793 provided for a 14-year term from grant.
See 1 PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1.07 (2d ed. 1995).
102. For example, 25 countries plus the African Intellectual Property
Organization (OAPI) countries have shorter terms from the date of filing; 15 start
protection from the date of grant. See WIPO Study, supra note 89. See also 2
J.W. BAXTER ET AL.. WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 6.00-6.01 (1992) (listing
patent terms).
103.
Patents in Commonwealth countries expired at the same date their
United Kingdom counterparts expired. WIPO Study, supra note 89. Article 4bls
of the Paris Convention, supra note 26, requires: "(5) Patents obtained with the
benefit of priority shall, in the various countries of the Union, have a duration
equal to that which they would have, had they been applied for or granted without
the benefit of priority." This requirement has now been implemented in the
United States under 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(3) (1995).
104. The optimal term for a patent has been studied. See, e.g., Machlup,

supra note 7, at 66-73 (shortening or lengthening the duration of patents);
WILLIAM D. NORDHAuS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE 76-86 (1969) (the
optional life of a patent); F.M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH. 130-41 (1984)
(theory of optimal patent life); J.E.S. PARKER, THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 30306 (2d ed. 1978); C. Michael White, Why a Seventeen Year Patent. 38 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC'Y 839 (1956). See GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8, at 36 (summarizing
studies).
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provide a special bounty to owners of certain classes of
inventions, particularly pharmaceuticals. 105
In sum, the TRIPS provisions on statutory subject matter
(Article 27) and mandatory term of patent protection (Article 33)
are submitted to have significant natural right aspects. They
provide universal subject matter protection for substantially all
inventions and provide a uniform term of protection, irrespective
of subject matter. This protection must be accorded by a member
of GATT, regardless of its impact on social welfare in that country.
According to a natural rights thesis, these rights are so important

that individual member welfare should not stand in the way of
their being protected as an entitlement of the creators. This
invokes a
counter-instrumentalist policy that members,
regardless of their state of industrialization, should sacrifice their
national interests in favor of the posited higher order of
international trade. 10 6

III. NRAPTS

VERSUS ECONOMIC THEORIES

While it may take a true believer to embrace a natural
property rights justification for the significant benefits offered
under patent TRIPS to patent owners in developed countries,
nonetheless there may be other justifications, in particular
economic ones, that would lead the world community, including
developing countries and LDCs, to submit to such a regime under
GATT. In this Section, the natural rights aspects of patent TRIPS,
identified and discussed supra, will be evaluated in terms of
economic theories that have been or may be advanced in
10 7
justification of patent TRIPS.

105. Harvey Bale, executive vice-president of the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association, stated with regard to the effects of the absence of
pipeline protection in the TRIPS Agreement: "If the Uruguay Round pact takes
effect in 1993 and developing countries do not have to abide by its provisions
until 2003, then drugs under development as late as 2013 could be pirated....

We're talking about $100 billion In lost sales." See Infra note 135 (indicating
importance of patents to the pharmaceutical industry based on 30-year review of
studies).
106. Cf. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 7,which uses instrumentalist language
"to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge," but
makes clear that there should be a "balance of rights and obligations," which
TRIPS then proceeds to define.
107. The author has been critical of the claim that patent economic theories
can predict the validity of patents in actual cases. A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified
Economic Theories of Patents-The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
267 (1996) [hereinafter Oddi, Un-Unffled Economic Theories). However, the author
has concluded that such theories provide a valuable analytic technique for
evaluating the efficiency of various provisions of patent law. Id. at 327. Several
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A. Patent-InducedTheory
A basic premise of the patent-induced theory is that there
would be a net benefit to society if patents were granted only to

those inventions that were actually induced by the patent
system. 10 8 Thus, there should be a causal connection between
the creation of an invention and the patent system (i.e., but for
10 9
the patent system this invention would not have been created).

There is little question that many inventions have been and

1 10
would still be created without the incentive of a patent system.
These so-called non-patent-induced inventions would be created,
in any event, as a consequence of competitive market pressures.

economic models have been developed to study the effect of patent rights on
North-South trade. See JUDITH C. CHIN & GENE M. GROSSMAN, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NORTH-SOUTH TRADE (National Bureau of Economic Research)
Working Paper No. 2769, 1988) (finding the South benefiting from "pirating" and
the North being harmed); ISHAC DIrvAN & DANI RODRIK, PATENTS, APPROPRIATE
TECHNOLOGY AND NORTH-SOuTH TRADE (The World Bank Working Paper No. 251,
1989) (implying that if the welfare of the South is preferred to that of the North,
patent protection in the South need not be lower, but that increased protection in
the South need not be beneficial to the North). Both studies include the caveat
that it is not clear whether the South should increase or decrease intellectual
property protection. Compare Richard T. Rapp and Richard P. Rozek, Benefits
and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries. J. WORLD
TRADE, Oct. 1990, at 75 (concluding that benefits in the form of investment and
technology transfer exceed costs in developing countries) with Edwin Mansfield,
Unauthorized Use of Intellectual Property: Effects on Investment Technology
Transfer, and Innovation, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS, supra note 8. at 140 (finding no
statistically significant correlation between the perceived strength of a given
country's intellectual property protection and direct investment by U.S. firms in
the late 1980s and 1990s).
108. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL]; Douglas F. Greer,
The Case Against Patent Systems in Less-Developed Countries, 8 J. INT'L L. & ECON.
223 (1973); Alfred E. Kahn, The Role of Patents,In COMPETITION, CARTELS AND THEIR
REGULATION 308 (John P. Miller ed., 1962); A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness:

Invention Protection In the Twenty-First Century, 38 Am. U. L. REV. 1097, 1101-02,
1114-16 (1989) [hereinafter Oddi, Beyond Obviousness); A. Samuel Oddi, An
Uneaster Casefor Copyright Than for Patent Protection of Computer Programs. 72
NEB. L. REV. 351 (1993) [hereinafter Oddi, Uneasier Case]; A. Samuel Oddi, The
InternationalPatentSystem and Third World Development. Reality or Myth? 1987
DUKE L.J. 831 (1987) [hereinafter Oddi, InternationalPatentSystem].
109.
"Induced" is used in a broad sense with the understanding that the
patent system may induce inventions at various stages in the developmental
process-from the conception stage through the improvement (commercialization)
stage, as well as by providing an alternative to protection by secrecy. See Oddi.
UneasierCase, supra note 108, at 374-75.
110.
Few would doubt the maternity of many inventions.
See JOHN
BARTLETT. FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 134 (Emily M. Beck ed., 15th ed. 1980)
(Anonymous: Latin-mater artium necessitas).
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The market often provides an adequate incentive for their creation
in the forms of the competitive advantages associated with
headstart, market recognition, and learning curve advantage. 1 '

There are, nonetheless, certain types of inventions that, in

theory, depend significantly upon the existence of the inducement
of the patent system. The most important type of patent-induced
invention has been identified as a "revolutionary" invention by

Professor Scherer.

He defines these inventions as those

producing
revolutionary
changes
in
consumption
or
production. 11 2
This type of invention generally has an
indeterminable
benefit-to-cost
ratio,
normally
requires
considerable developmental investment, and has a significant risk
13
of failure. 1

111.
See SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL, supra note 108, at 443-48. See also Oddl,
Beyond Obviousness, supra note 108, at 1114-16. Perhaps a classic example of
high benefit-to-cost inventions would be the plow covered by the 798 patent
invalidated in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). This was supposedly
an improvement patent over the plow covered by the 811 patent. In actuality, the
798 patent was a defensive patent never marketed by Graham, but used to
exclude competitors. See Oddi, Un-Unifled Economic Theories, supra note 107, at
314-16 (discussing the history of these patents). In the context of identifying
nonobvious inventions, the court in Graham stated that: "The inherent problem
was to develop some means of weeding out those inventions which would not be
disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a patent." 383 U.S. at 11.
Obvious inventions did not need the inducement; they would become available in
any event.
In the context of providing patent-like protection, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) stated:
"State law protection for techniques and designs whose disclosure has already
been induced by market rewards may conflict with the very purpose of the patent
laws by decreasing the range of ideas available as the building blocks of further
innovation."

112. It is conceivable that without a patent system certain spectacular
technical contributions-those effecting a genuine revolution in production
or consumption patterns--might be lost or (more plausibly) seriously
delayed because their support lends itself poorly to rational benefit/cost
calculation. Such innovations may lie off the beaten paths of industrial
technology, where no firm or group of companies has a natural advantage;
and the innovator may be forced to develop completely new marketing
channels and production facilities to exploit them. They may entail
greater technological and market uncertainties, higher development costs,
and longer inception-to-commercialization lags than the vast bulk of all
industrial innovation.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL, supra note 108, at 448. Examples would include: the
airplane, antibiotics, instant photography, lasers, sulfonamids, synthetic textiles,
telegraph, telephone, television, tranquilizers, transistors, and xerography. See
SHERMAN
GEE,
TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER,
INNOVATION,
AND
INTERNATIONAL
COmpETITIVENESS 161 (1981); UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE, REVOLUTIONARY IDEAS,

PATENTS & PROGRESS INAMERICA (1976).
113.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL supra note 108, at 448.
Scherer identifies
another category of inventions that are dependent on the patent system having a
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1996]

On the other hand, many inventions commonly have a high
benefit-to-cost ratio by virtue of being improvements in existing
Because the product
product lines of a given enterprise. 1 14
already has a market and a distribution system, there is a
relatively high likelihood of success for any improvement. These

types of high benefit-to-cost inventions are likely to be far less
dependent on the patent system and may be identified as nonpatent- or market-induced, their primary inducement being the
market itself. Hence, granting a patent tends to be costly because
the public would, in any event, have received them free of the
patent monopoly. 1 15 According to the patent-induced theory, a
patent system is justified if the ratio of patent-induced to nonpatent-induced inventions is at least high enough to insure a net
benefit to society.116
what impact will the
One may then ask the question:
imposition of universal statutory subject matter and duration
requirement have on the ratio of patent-induced to non-patentinduced inventions on a worldwide basis? First, it is clear that
there will be a significantly greater incentive offered to invention
producers. The inducement to invent has been augmented by the
number of additional countries who now protect previously
unprotected subject matter for an extended term.
One must then address a series of follow-up questions. Is the
incentive offered by the marginal addition of further countries
necessary for the creation of particular inventions? Will this
marginal increase in incentive result in, at least, a marginally
equivalent additional investment in research and development for
the creation of inventions that would not otherwise have come

low beneflt-to-cost ratio. These would include detail inventions in a crowded
market where there would be little incentive to create them but for the possibility
of patent protection, albeit narrow protection.
benefits little from their creation. Id.
Id. at 443-48.
114.

115.

Scherer concludes that society

Id.

116. [Eixcept when innovators' profits come largely from cannibalization of
the profits that would otherwise be enjoyed by the producers of substitute
products, it is likely that society as a whole (i.e., including both consumers
and producers) gains from inventions and innovations induced or hastened
by the grant of patent rights.
Id. at 443 (emphasis added); see also Greer, supra note 108, at 224
("Nevertheless, it can be formally demonstrated that the economic benefits of
such inventions (in the form of production cost savings or new product
consumption utilities) always exceed those social costs to yield a net social
benefit."); Kahn, supra note 108, at 311 ("So long as the innovation would not
have been forthcoming without the patent, this social cost must always be less

than the benefit; but of course the converse is equally true.").
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Will any additional inventions so created be of the

type dependent upon the patent system, and, in particular, will
more revolutionary inventions be created?
While it is difficult to measure, there seems to be little
evidence that there was a dearth of inventions prior to the
adoption of patent TRIPS. 1 17 The primary problem that TRIPS
was intended to solve appears to be that inventions, once created,
were being copied in countries that did not provide adequate
intellectual property protection. 1 18 Indeed, with the incentives
provided by the patent systems of the United States, the
European Union, and Japan, it may be difficult to ascertain what
additional incentives would be necessary in order to produce
revolutionary inventions, let alone improvement inventions. I 9
While some increased investment in inventions may be
anticipated with certain large market countries now providing
patent protection previously unavailable, 20 it is difficult to
conclude that the addition of any other countries on a marginal
basis will provide a proportional increase in invention creation.
To the contrary, providing protection in marginal countries is
likely to reduce the net benefit in those countries whose patent
systems had nothing to do with the inducement for creation of
those inventions.
Without protection for such non-patentinduced inventions, those countries, of course, could freely copy.
With respect to those countries that had no inducing power
in the creation of the invention, one can hardly say that they are
"free riders" because there was no causal connection between the
created invention and their patent system. To the contrary, this
may be seen as "free loading" by the patent owners who derive the
primary economic benefit from the import monopoly in these

117.

The rhetorical argument is that more would be invested in research

and development (R&D) if the investment could be protected. But even assuming
increased investment, it does not logically follow that this investment was
necessary to create an adequate number of inventions, especially societally
beneficial ones.
118. See supra note 37.
119. By definition revolutionary inventions would have worldwide impact.
Commercialization of these inventions will begin in developed countries and then
trickle down to developing countries.
120. Obvious examples would be countries with large populations, such as:
China (1.16 billion-1992), India (846 million-1991), Indonesia (188
million-1993), Brazil (146 niilion-1991), Pakistan (119 million-1992),
Bangladesh (119 million-1993), and Nigeria (89 million-1991).
See THE
STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK (Brian Hunter ed., 131st ed. 1994-95). The problem with
such markets, however, is the low GNP per capita: China ($370-1991), India
($330-1991). Indonesia ($620-1992), Bangladesh ($220-1991), Pakistan
($400-1991), Nigeria ($290-1991)--compared to a GNP per capita in the United
States of $22,560 in 1991; however, note Brazil had a $2,680 GNP per capita in
1991. Id.
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marginal countries. 1 2 1 The patent systems of such countries
provide no needed incentive to invent, but protection is offered as
a boon in order to remain a member in good standing of GATT.
These arrangements force the marginal countries to pay for
something that they otherwise would have received for free but for
patent TRIPS, presuming they have the technological 12
ability
to
2
replicate such inventions created in the developed world.
In sum, it is difficult to conclude that the ratio of patentinduced to non-patent-induced inventions will increase under
patent TRIPS. Moreover, it is also difficult to conclude that there
will be an increase in invention creation proportional to the
increase of market protection for a given subject matter for a
longer term.
B. Rent DissipationTheory
Society may be seen as benefiting from receiving an invention
in excess of its development costs, and the inventor should be
compensated by a "rent" in the form of a patent monopoly. 123 The
amount of the rent would be the difference between what society
12 4
is willing to pay for the invention and the development costs.

By evoking the rent by means of a patent monopoly, free riders
are barred from copying and the incentive to invest in
development is protected.' 2 5
However, according to rent
dissipation theory as posited by Professor Grady and Mr.

Alexander, the incentive provided by the patent system may result

121. This is clear in those cases where, even though patent protection was
available, the owner of the invention failed to avail itself of that protection In a
given country. It is even clearer when a particular country does not provide
protection on certain subject matters and investment is made toward creating an
invention In the unprotected subject matter category.
122. Without patent protection in these marginal countries, even without
the technological ability to replicate, there would be no import monopoly and
presumably the invention would be available at more competitive pricing.
123. See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent
Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REv. 305 (1992); Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal
Circuit's Patent Non-Obviousness Standards: Theoretical Perspectives on Recent
Doctrinal Changes, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1051 (1991). Judge Posner defines "rentseeking" as "the incentive to overproduce goods that promise a return greater
than the cost of production (that is. an economic 'rent'), and to the resulting waste
when rents are transformed, through competition to obtain them, into costs."
RIcHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 342 (1988); POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS.

supra note 59, at 37-38 (analyzing the costs of such behavior).

See generally,

ToWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SociETY (James M. Buchanan et al. eds.,

1980).
124.
125.

Grady & Alexander. supra note 123, at 308.
Id.
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in rent dissipation, imposing societal costs. 126 They identify three

forms of rent dissipation. The first form is at the conception
stage, where multiple independent inventors may be investing in
the development of the same invention. 12 7 The second form is at
the improvement stage, where a basic invention may induce
others to over-invest in improving that invention. 12 8 The third
stage that may result in excess rent dissipation is the overinvestment in maintaining the invention in secrecy. 129 The basic
question thus faced under the rent dissipation theory is whether
mandating universal subject matter and duration protection
results in diminished or increased rent dissipation.
At the conception stage, an increase in rent dissipation can
be anticipated primarily because of the greatly increased incentive
to win the patent "lottery," compared to being limited to individual
countries with varying degrees of protection. Hence, uniformity
would add to the incentive for enterprises throughout the world
(especially the developed world) to invest
in the hopes of obtaining
30
essentially a world patent monopoly.1
Increased rent dissipation may also be anticipated at the
improvement stage. Again, this would be based on the premise
that there would be a greater incentive to invest in improving
inventions if worldwide protection could be obtained on the
improvements. This may be a particularly strong incentive in an
evolving world market.13 1 Grady and Alexander maintain that
rent dissipation may be minimized by precluding broad protection
on fundamental inventions because they, by definition, cannot be
improved upon. Therefore, it would be highly rent dissipating to
provide the incentive to create such inventions.' 3 2 On the
contrary, detail inventions, which indicate they may be improved
(i.e., "signal" improvements), should be protected so that others
would be discouraged from trying
to improve such inventions and
33
thereby dissipate resources.1
126.
Id. at 306-09. The rent dissipation theory as postulated by Grady and
Alexander is critiqued in Donald L. Martin, Reducing Anticipated Rewards from
Innovation Through Patents: Or Less Is More, 78 VA. L. REV. 351 (1992); and in
Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District- Observations on the Grady.
Alexander Thesis. 78 VA. L. REV. 359, 376-77 (1992).
127. Grady & Alexander, supra note 123, at 306-07.
128.
Id. at 308.
129.
Id. at 308-09, 318.
130.
For example, the countries that previously excluded such categories of
pharmaceuticals and food products are now forced into the combined incentive
pool.
131.
This may be especially true where local conditions may lead to various
improvements, for example, preference'due to local customs, available materials,
standardization, etc.
132.
Grady & Alexander, supra note 123, at 321.
133.
Id. at 320.
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Of course, there is no indication that fundamental or basic
inventions would be treated less favorably in the various
countries (especially in developed countries) after TRIPS than
Indeed, with respect to
would any other inventions.' 3 4
pharmaceutical inventions, which receive special status in TRIPS
and tend to be of a broad fundamental nature, a great incentive
will be offered to competing enterprises to invest in the creation of
35
such inventions.
Whether or not there will be excessive dissipation at the
improvement stage will depend upon the scope of protection given

to patents in each country.

The broader the scope, the less

incentive to make improvements on that patent.

However, if

narrow scope is provided, such as in Japan (compared with the
United States), then it may be assumed that there will be an
With universal
increased incentive to find improvements. 3 6

subject matter protection for a common duration,

certain

countries may find it in their self-interest to provide a narrow
scope of inventions in order to permit the local improvement of

134. See Oddi, Un-Unjfled Economic Theories. supra note 107, at 290-95,
303-05 (illustrating cases where broad protection was provided).
135. In sharp contrast to the situation pertaining in most other industries
and the electronics field in particular, the patent grant often confers
My
significant benefit to innovators in the pharmaceutical field.
discussions with patent attorneys working for pharmaceutical firms
brought out two likely reasons for this situation. First, unusually strong
patents are obtainable in the chemical field, of which pharmaceuticals Is a
part. Second, it is often difficult to invent around a pharmaceutical
patent.
Pharmaceutical patents can be unusually strong because one may
patent an actual molecule found to have useful medical properties and its
analogs. One need not make each analog claimed but can simply refer to
lists of recognized functional equivalents for each component of the
molecule at issue....
Many pharmaceutical patents are difficult to invent around today
because the mechanisms by which pharmaceuticals achieve their medical
effects are often not well understood.
Epic VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 53 (1988).
136.
In Japan, once a patent application disclosing a basic invention is

published as required by Japanese patent law, it is common practice for
Japanese competitors immediately to begin to develop improvement inventions
and file numerous patent applications circumscribing the basic invention with
improvements.

See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,

U.S. COMPANIES' PATENT EXPERIENCES IN JAPAN 49-50 GAO/GGD-93-126 (1993)
(surveying experience of 360 U.S. firms with the Japanese patent system)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT-JAPAN]. A major complaint of U.S. companies with
Japanese patent practices is the narrow scope of protection granted to basic
inventions. Id. at 3, 48-49.
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fundamental inventions and, in addition, to protect those
improvements.
In sum, it is far from apparent that rent dissipation will be
less prevalent under TRIPS than under a country-by-country
system. At least with respect to rent dissipation due to excessive
investment in maintaining inventions in secrecy, some lessening
of dissipation may be expected if Section 7 (Protection of
Undisclosed Information) is fully implemented, requiring members

to provide trade secret protection.13 7 Nonetheless, this provision
would apply only if there is a transfer of trade secrets into the
country. With the expansion of protection under patent TRIPS,
invention owners will be more likely to rely on patent protection
than on trade secret protection, and any savings in rent
dissipation is likely to be overridden by increased dissipation at
the conception and improvement stages. 138
C. Race-to-Invent Theory
The "race-to-invent" theory posits that "faster is better" with
respect to the creation of inventions. 139 The rationale for this
theory, developed by Professors Merges and Nelson, Is that
economic well-being increases with productivity, productivity
increases with the number of inventions, and the number of
research
and
development
inventions
increases
with

137.

TRIPS, supra note 6. art. 39(2) provides:

Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing
information lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired
by, or used by others without their consent in a manner contrary to
honest commercial practices so long as such information:
- is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise
configuration and assembly of Its components, generally known among
or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal
with the kind of information in question;
- has commercial value because it is secret; and
- has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by
the person lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.
138.

As stated in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974):

Where patent law acts as a barrier, trade secret law functions relatively as
a sieve. The possibility that an inventor who believes his [or her] invention
meets the standards of patentability will sit back, rely on trade secret law,
and after one year of use forfeit any right to patent protection, 35 U.S.C.
102(b), is remote indeed.
139. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 878 (1990) ("Our argument rests on a
simple premise: when it comes to invention and innovation, faster is better."); see
also Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803 (1988).
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expenditures. Accordingly, the faster inventions are created, the
greater the economic benefit to society. 140 As a corollary to this,
Merges and Nelson, on the basis of empirical studies, conclude
that technological development has often been retarded when
broad patent protection has been obtained in certain
industries. 14 1 Thus, they conclude that a relatively narrow scope
of protection would be preferable, even for fundamental
inventions, so that there will be a race-to-improve upon these
inventions toward the end of increasing productivity. 1 4 2 In
contrast, if broad control were provided by the means of patents,
this would tend to retard the evolution of a particular technology.
If a broad scope of protection within a given industry and a
given country retards technological development in that country,
it would logically follow that this retardation would, in all
likelihood, increase if uniform worldwide subject matter and
duration protection were provided. Thus, industries acquiring
broad, worldwide patent protection would have limited incentive
for rapid improvement and would proceed to exploit current
inventions. Concomitantly, competitors (domestic and foreign)
would have limited incentive to improve these patented inventions
if such broad control were provided on a worldwide basis. The
antidote to this consequence would be to limit the scope of patent
protection. This, however, is hardly a likely outcome, particularly
in highly industrialized countries, with the possible exception of
Japan.143

With particular reference to TRIPS, Professor Merges
concludes that it may not be in the economic interest of all
countries to adopt a strong system of intellectual property
protection. "Itis difficult in practice to determine which countries
would actually benefit from strengthened intellectual property
rights. But clearly, a monolithic 'stronger rights' approach will
not work. Unless enough country-by-country flexibility can be
built into a multilateral framework, bilateralism may be the best
solution."'14 4 Patent TRIPS imposes a contrary solution.

140. Merges & Nelson, supranote 139, at 878.
141. Id. at 877, 884-908 (analyzing electrical lighting industry, automobiles
and airplanes, radio, semiconductors and computers, chemical industries and
science-based industries).
142. Id. at 876.
143. See supra note 136.
144. Merges. supra note 38, at 246.
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D. ProspectTheory
The prospect theory of patents, developed by Professor Kitch,
provides an economic rationale for an essentially natural rights
treatment of patents. 145 A prospect is defined as "a particular
146
opportunity to develop a known technological possibility."
Thus, Kitch maintains that patent rights should be treated as any
other property right, and patent owners should be able to provide
broad coordinating power over the future developments of their
inventions. Treating patents as property minimizes transaction
costs, eliminates the need for secrecy, and provides notice to
potential copiers.' 47 Kitch argues that providing such broad
coordinating power will not result in the underutilization of the
competing inventions,
inventions because of the availability of
148
which will result in a net societal benefit.
Accordingly, if broad coordinating power is desirable within a
given country's patent system, the extension of this coordinating
power on a global basis would produce even more desirable
economic results. Therefore, it is not surprising that the prospect
theory offers a theoretical economic basis for patent TRIPS beyond
a pure natural rights theory. Moreover, Professor Kitch, contrary
to conventional wisdom that developing countries would submit to
TRIPS in order to obtain the trade advantages of GATT, recently
concluded that it would be in the self-interest of developing
14 9
countries themselves to participate.
Kitch's first argument is based upon the realization that the
information disclosed in the patent is not adequate to enable the
working of patented inventions in developing countries. 15 0 The
rationale for this argument appears to be that a strong patent
system is needed to attract technologically sophisticated
These employers would need to have access to
employers.

145. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.
L. & ECON. 265, 265 (1977) [hereinafter Kitch, Nature & Functions]; see also
Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights, 8 REs. L. & ECON. 31
(1986).
146. Kitch, Nature & Functions. supra note 145, at 266.
147. Id. at 276-80.
148. Id. at 274.
149. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13
UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 166, 167 (1994) [hereinafter Kitch, Patent Policy] ("A
conventional answer would be that [developing countries] Join the international
intellectual property system in order to gain other trading advantages from the
developed world."); see also Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and
Costs of IntellectualProperty ProtectionIn Developing Countries, 24 J. WORLD TRADE
75, 102 (1990) (concluding that protecting intellectual property should be a
public policy goal of developing countries).
150. Kitch, PatentPolicy, supra note 149, at 173-75.
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technically trained employees, the ability to restrict these
employees from transferring this technology to other employers,
and the ability to market their products in other markets. 1 5 1
As technological information resides in the hands of patentowning enterprises in developed countries, this argument
assumes that these patent owners are willing to transfer the
necessary technology to enable the patent to be worked in a
particular country. This assumption may hold occasionally, but it
is hardly universal that technology owners have an economic
interest in providing the wherewithal to produce an invention in a

given country. In most instances, the primary motive of patent
owners would seem to be to preserve the import market by means
of patents. They would agree to the transfer of technology for the
local working of that invention only when it was to their economic
advantage, principally in terms of obtaining comparative
Indeed, patent TRIPS has
advantage by local production. 152
weakened the grounds of the grant of compulsory licenses, as will
153
be discussed infra.
Kitch's second argument is based upon the realization that
the technological sophistication available in developed countries
may not be suitable for developing countries. 154 Thus, developing
countries need technology that is adaptable to their particular
needs. The argument continues that, with a patent system, an
incentive would be provided to local enterprises to develop
technology suitable for the particular industrialized level of their
country.' 5 5 The assumptions of this argument are that there is
sufficient infrastructure to determine what is technologically
needed and that enterprises in developed countries have an
incentive to provide basic information to accommodate the
relatively unsophisticated industrial needs of a particular country.
As the owners of technology are more likely to be interested in
maintaining an import monopoly in a given country, transfer
would occur only in those instances where it would be to their
economic interest to transfer technology at whatever level of
sophistication.
The third argument is that developing countries should be
able to pay for patent rights because "poor countries will
inevitably pay proportionately less than wealthy countries for the

151.
152.

Id.at 171-76.
For example, cheap labor, available raw materials, geographical

location, local market size, etc.
153.
154.

See Infra text accompanying notes 171-75.
Kitch, Patent Policy, supra note 149, at 176-77.

155.

Id. at 177.
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use of patent rights."1 5 6 Again, the assumption is that patent
owners are willing to license enterprises in developing countries.
Does "proportionality" mean in proportion to the absolute value
paid in developed countries or, perhaps, upon the ratio of gross
domestic product or some other proportional scale? In any event,
with the admission that developing countries require know-how in
addition to patent rights, one would expect that developing
countries would pay proportionally more, as they require more
than a mere naked patent license, which may be all that is
1 57
needed in an industrialized country.
In sum, these arguments apparently depend upon the
assumption of a willingness on the part of patent and technology

owners to transfer the necessary technology to developing
countries in order to enable enterprises in developing countries to
work the patented inventions. Such an assumption may run
contrary to normal assumptions concerning the economic
behavior of patent and technology owners.
E. PortableFence Theory
Professor Reichman postulates that international law should
establish for intellectual creations a "surrogate form of ownership
by instituting a fictitious system of portable fences."15 8 Such a
portable fence would bar the replication of an intellectual creation
of another while permitting the transfer of ideas from one mind to
another.159 He argues that, in light of the current economic

156.

Id.

157.

It is, at least, the anecdotal impression of the author, while engaged in

licensing patents and know-how for multinational corporations to enterprises in
developing countries, that this was the expectation.
158.
Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 35, at 803.
Professor
Reichman has written extensively on the GATT negotiations concerning
intellectual property. See generally, Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards.
supra note 95; J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT's Uruguay
Round: Competitive Prospectsfor Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated
World Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171. 173-78. 254-66
(1993); J.H. Reichman. Beyond the HistoricalLines of Demarcation: Competition
Law, Intellectual PropertyRights and InternationalTrade After the GATT's Uruguay
Round, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 75 (1993); J.H. REICHMAN, IMPLICATIONS OF THE DRAFT
TRIPS AGREEMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AS COMPETITORS IN AN INTEGRATED

WORLD MARKET (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Discussion

Paper No. 73, 1993).
159.

Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 35, at 803.

The costs of the patent system include (besides inducing potentially

excessive Investment in inventing) driving a wedge between price and
marginal cost .... Once an invention is made, its costs are sunk; in
economic terms, they are zero. Hence a price that includes a royalty to the
inventor will exceed the opportunity cost of the product in which the
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necessity to innovate, any historical differences between tangible
property and intellectual property are anachronistic.
This
conclusion, he urges, does not result "from an appeal to natural
160
justice," but rather "from refined economic analysis."
The next step in Reichman's logic is to posit that the portable
fence against replication of intellectual products does not stop at
the boundaries of the given country but follows that product
wherever it goes.' 61 Because the tangible property of aliens is
protected under international law from confiscation, he reasons
by analogy that intangible intellectual property, which often is
much more valuable, should be similarly protected against such
expropriation.
"To pretend that aliens have no legal claims
arising from wholesale, unauthorized uses of their most valuable
property while respecting laws that protect less valuable alien
property only because it is tangible rather than intangible is to
16 2
exalt form over substance."
While Professor Reichman's arguments are ingenious, they
contain that element of circularity that is inherent when
addressing the philosophical foundations of property, and, in
particular, whether a right of property inheres in intangible
intellectual creations. This is the paradox of value: does property
have inherent value as a natural right entitlement, or is it only
valuable because society has decided to protect it, presumably on
utilitarian or instrumentalist grounds?' 6 3 If the fence vanishes
once an intellectual creation leaves the domestic jurisdiction of
the fence-erecting country, so goes its value. In essence, this
portable fence would appear to be an aspect of an entitlement

arising from natural rights, so its value must be recognized even

invention is embodied. This wedge, however, Is analytically the same as the

cost of afence to demarcate a property right In land; it is an indispensable
cost of using the property rights system to allocate resources.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsis, supra note 59, at 39-40 (emphasis added). The
imposition of the cost of a "portable fence" raises the question of whether there is
sufficient incentive to invent without portability.
160.
Reichman, GATT Convention, supra note 35. at 806.
161.
Id. at 806-811.
162. Id. at 810-11.
163. This is well put by Professor Penrose:
The more widely a good can be used, the greater, surely, is its total
usefulness and to limit its use is to limit its usefulness although this may
at the same time give it an economic value.
This is, of course, a
restatement of the famous paradox of value, but so far as inventions are
concerned a price is put on them not because they are scarce but in order
to make them scarce to those who want to use them.
PENROSE, supranote 7, at 22.
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though to do so may be to the economic disadvantage of a
particular country (i.e., be noninstrumentalist). It is, of course,
more efficient for a particular nation to permit the replication of
intellectual creations of foreigners (free ride) than it is to pay rents
for the purchase of the imported "patented" product in addition to
16 4
being excluded by the fence from replicating it.
In short, it would seem that the portable fence theory,
requiring the acceptance of a universal system of patent
protection, is founded on the premise (a priori)that an inadequate
number of intellectual products would be created without such a
worldwide incentive.
Nonetheless, it is far from clear that
inadequate incentives were being provided when each country
could determine its own national policy for protection or that
universal protection is better adapted to optimize social welfare on
165
a global scale, let alone at the national level.
F. Summary
The foregoing analysis, even if somewhat speculative, does
not lead to the clear conclusion that the identified natural right
aspects of patent TRIPS can be justified on any of the economicsbased theories. The patent-induced and rent-dissipation theories
lead to contrary conclusions, primarily because of the overincentive being provided by a uniform global system. The race-toinvent theory does not support these natural rights aspects
because of the likelihood of retardation in the development of
given technologies due to centralized control on a worldwide
basis. The prospect theory is the antithesis of the race-to-invent

theory, but it depends upon the premise that broad coordinating
power in the hands of patent owners would achieve efficient
results, not only on the domestic level but also at the global level.
While it may be admitted that intangible intellectual
creations may be more "valuable" than tangible property, this
does not resolve the issue of whether that value (the portable
fence) results because it is created by the sovereign as a privilege
or results as a natural right entitlement. Indeed, it may be asked
whether the fundamental purpose of an international system
based on a natural property right theory is to induce Inventions
or to prevent the replication of inventions.

164.
The patent owner may elect to exploit the patent solely by importation
or may collect royalties by licensing domestic enterprises, whichever presumably
optimizes profits.
165.
See supra note 8.
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IV.

ECONOMIC IMPACT AND STRATEGIES

A. Economic Impact
The big winners under patent TRIPS would clearly be those
enterprises (read multinational corporations) in developed
countries that create inventions and are heavily engaged in
international trade. Particular winners would be those entities in
the pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical industries that

receive "supernatural" property rights under patent TRIPS. The
benefits are clear: patent protection is now mandated for fields of
technology that were previously unprotected in many countries,
and the duration of protection is set at twenty years from the
filing date compared to significantly shorter periods, even when
that subject matter was protected.
Again to the advantage of such enterprises in developed
countries is that under Article 6 of TRIPS the "exhaustion of
intellectual property rights" is retained within the domestic
Such a retention
jurisdiction of the respective members. 1 66
appears inconsistent with a natural rights theory. Under natural
rights, the invention itself is theorized as being ubiquitous and
For
hence entitled to protection everywhere by its nature.
purposes of logical consistency within a natural property rights
theory, it should follow that, once an invention is placed in
commerce ("first sale") by the patent owner or with the owner's
authorization, this should "exhaust" any patent rights anywhere
16 7
in the world and the product may freely cross national borders. 6 8
After all, it is a primary goal of the GATT to enhance free trade.1

166. "For the purposes of dispute [resolution] under this Agreement,
subject to the provisions of Articles 3 [national treatment) and 4 (most-favorednation treatment] above, nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the
issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights." TRIPS, supra note 6, art.
6.
167. The United States imposes essentially a territorial exhaustion doctrine.
See 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 16.03(2) (1995) (U.S. application of the "firstsale" doctrine); Id. § 16.05(3) (U.S. application of exhaustion doctrine with respect
to imported products). Compare the European community, which imposes an
essentially community-wide exhaustion doctrine.

More extensive rights recognised [sic] by national legislation or case-law
on the exercise of patents or trademarks (or analogous rights) such as the
right to object to the importation of goods which have been marketed in
another Member State by or with the consent of the patentee or trade
mark owner, are not saved by the terms of the first sentence of Article 36
EEC. In these circumstances the rights are said to have been exhausted.
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While all members must provide a broad subject matter
protection for a long uniform term for all inventions, according to
Article 6,169 individual members may adopt a very restrictive

exhaustion policy to exclude importation of patented inventions
legitimately made in other member states with the authorization
of the patent owner. 170 This retention of the exhaustion doctrine
within the domestic jurisdiction of members provides significant
trade advantages to patent owners. They may control production
and optionally exploit their patents domestically.
In other
countries where patent protection has been obtained, they may
maintain an import monopoly or may exploit that market by
licensing. Yet, under the domestic exhaustion rule of the
producing countries, the patent owner or licensee can restrict
access to its domestic market and hence avoid any adverse
competition that may arise from comparative advantages of
foreign authorized production.
Patent TRIPS, furthermore, weakens the ability of members
to use compulsory licenses in order to insure local working of
inventions when those inventions are only being exploited in their
country by importation. In Article 31, restrictions are added
17 1
beyond those provided in Article 5A of the Paris Convention,

P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE

399 (Laurence W. Gormley ed., 2d ed. 1989). See also
Bronckers, supra note 93, at 1268) (discussing worldwide exhaustion and
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

concluding "I submit that it would be simply wrong for the developed countries to
blame a developing country for choosing a broad exhaustion doctrine.").
168. The preamble of the original GATT Agreement of 1947 provides: "Being
desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
openedfor signature, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 196 [hereinafter
GATT].
169. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 6.
170. Id.
171. A.--(l) The importation by the patentee into the country where the
patent has been granted of articles manufactured in any of the countries
of the Union shall not entail forfeiture of the patent.
(2) Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative
measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the
abuses which might result from the exclusive rights conferred by the
patent, for example, failure to work.
(3) Forfeiture of the patent shall not be prescribed except In cases
where the grant of compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to
prevent such abuses. No proceeding for the forfeiture or revocation of a
patent may be instituted before the expiration of two years from the grant
of the first compulsory license.
(4)A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of
failure to work or insufficient working before the expiration of a period of
four years from the date of filing of the patent application or three years
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including the requirement that an effort be made to obtain a
license from the patent owner prior to seeking a compulsory
license. 17 2 Also, the compulsory license may only be granted for a
1 73
limited scope and duration and for an authorized purpose.
Indeed, for semiconductor technology, a compulsory license may

only be obtained for public noncommercial uses or to remedy an
anticompetitive practice. 174
Thus, it would appear that
semiconductor technology is excluded from any local working
requirement except on these two grounds.
Semiconductor
technology may not rise to the "supernatural" rights status of
pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals, but the technology
does receive
super-immunity from compulsory licenses.
Moreover,
any
compulsory
license
granted
must
be
"predominantly for the supply of the domestic market."'175 Thus,
compulsory licensees would be precluded from achieving
economies of scale by exporting, even to countries where the
patent owner has not obtained analogous patent protection.
A final benefit to patent-owning enterprises is the
requirement in TRIPS that members implement various domestic
remedies with respect to violations of intellectual property
rights. 176 In addition, procedures are provided within the World
Trade Organization (WTO) for dispute resolution concerning
whether members are in compliance with the mandates of
177
TRIPS.
Presumably, developed countries also will be beneficiaries
under the "trickle down" effect from patent-owning enterprises
having primary industrial bases within such countries. Again,

from the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period last expires; it
shall be refused if the patentee justifies his [or her] inaction by legitimate
reasons. Such a compulsory license shall be non-exclusive and shall not
be transferable, even in the form of the grant of a sub-license, except with
that part of the enterprise or goodwill which exploits such license.
(5) The foregoing provisions shall be applicable, mutatis mutandis. to
utility models.

Paris Convention, supra note 26, art. 5(A).
172.

TRIPS, supra note 6, at art. 31(b).

173. Id. art. 31(c).
174. Id.
175. Id. art. 31(f).
176. Id. arts. 41-61.
177. Id. art. 64 (making the provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT
applicable to disputes under TRIPS); see generally Paul Edward Geller, Intellectual
Property In the Global Marketplace: Impact of TRIPS Dispute Settlements?. 29 INT'L
LAW 99 (1995); Robert E. Huder, Dispute Settlement. In COMPLETING THE URUGUAY
ROUND:

A RESULTS-ORIENTED APPROACH TO THE GATT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 180

(Jeffrey J. Schutt ed.. 1990) (discussing shortcomings of dispute resolution
mechanisms).
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presumably, these enterprises will increase investment in
research and development, thereby increasing the number of
inventions and hence the productivity to the benefit of these
countries and the economic and social well-being of their
nationals. Nonetheless, the economic theories discussed above

cast some doubt over the significance of any welfare gains to 17
be8

achieved by any increased investment in creating inventions.
While it seems likely that there will be some increased investment
in research and development (R&D), there may also be significant
profit taking with only marginal increases in R&D
expenditures. 17 9 Indeed, it would be surprising if the increases in
R&D would be proportional to the added incentives provided by a
worldwide market with universal subject matter and duration
protection.
In sum, one should remain agnostic concerning the long-term
benefits accruing to developed countries from the implementation
of patent TRIPS. There may, and probably will, be short-term
advantages to multinational corporations operating out of
developed countries, provided TRIPS is fully implemented and
enforced.
At first blush, the biggest losers under patent TRIPS would
appear to be the so-called newly industrialized countries (NICs),
which, after all, were the basic target of TRIPS. 180 Enterprises
within these countries availed themselves of foreign technology,
had the industrial capability of replicating it, and were evidently
competing effectively with the creators of this technology.' 8 1 If

178.

See supra text accompanying notes 107-65.

179.
This would appear to be the economic consequence of a switch from an
instrumental view of providing an incentive to create to an entitlement view of
reaping the rewards of creation by excluding others.
180.
NICs or newly industrializing economies (NIEs) are defined by Primo

Braga as follows:
NIEs are defined here as those developing economies that by 1989 had an

Income per capita of at least U.S. $2,000, a share of manufacturing in
gross national product of at least 30 percent, and exports of manufactured
products accounting for more than 40 percent of total export revenues.
Brazil, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, the Republic of Korea,
and Taiwan qualify as NIEs according to these criteria.
Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Newly Industrializing Economies, in GLOBAL
DIMENSIONS, supra note 8, at 168-69.
181. See Robert E. Evenson, Global Intellectual Property Rights Issues In
Perspective: A Concluding Panel Discussion,in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS supra note 8, at
360-63. Professor Evenson divides developing countries into stages. Stage 1
countries are essentially the least developed countries. Stage 2 countries are
more industrially advanced and range from those that have a "mastery of
conventional technology" to those that are in transition to being NICs and those
on the "threshold of technological competitiveness." Evenson, supra, tbl. 16-1;
see also Braga, supra note 180. at 169 ("It is also worth mentioning that all of
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the governments of the NICs fully implement patent TRIPS, it
should follow that this type of copying will be retarded within the
limits of enforcement. This would force enterprises operating
within these countries either to develop their own technology or to
seek licenses from the patent owners. The course of acquiring
licenses may, in the short term, be the preferred one, provided
that patent owners are amenable to granting licenses.1 8 2 As
these countries have made significant technological progress in a
very short period of time, it would seem that enterprises within
NICs will shortly have the capability of producing their own
technology, with the advantage of its particular adaptability to
their state of industrialization. Thus, over the long run, a
worldwide patent system, by protecting technology that may be
more readily usable domestically and transferable to other
countries in the Third World, may be to the advantage of the
NICs.
It is difficult to perceive what benefits will accrue to
developing countries, in particular LDCs, by the implementation
of patent TRIPS, unless the implementation results in the
increased transfer of technology to these countries. Increasing
patent protection without the concomitant development of an
industrial infrastructure with technological capability would not
advance whatever instrumental goals TRIPS espouses with
respect to third world countries.' 83 It is unlikely that the
"security interest" of patent protection will necessarily result in
the transfer of technology.' 8 4 Moreover, by the uniform subject
matter and duration requirement, LDCs must compete for
transfer of technology on grounds other than the extent of patent
protection provided.
In addition, the primary model for
developing countries and particularly LDCs redounding under
patent TRIPS would appear to be that of consumers.
The

them were exporting more than U.S. $3 billion per year of knowledge-intensive

products by the end of the 1980s.").
182. This may, in certain circumstances, present significant advantages to
patent owners over relying upon the import monopoly or trying to enforce their
patents in a foreign forum. Enterprises in NICs may also soon be in a position to

license or cross license their own patents.

See J. Davidson Frame, National

Commitment to Intellectual Property Protection: An Empirical Investigation, 2 J.L. &
TECH. 209. 216 (1987) (indicating that U.S. patents were being acquired by
enterprises in NICs).
183. See supra text accompanying note 80 (quoting preamble of TRIPS).
184.
Mansfield, supra note 107, at 107, 130 (study indicating no significant
statistical relationship between the strength of intellectual property protection in
a country and direct investment by U.S. terms); see also Oddi, InternationalPatent
System, supra note 108, at 848-55 (discussing the limited utility of patents to
developing countries for implementing the transfer of technology).
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implementation of TRIPS insures an import monopoly in these
countries for the exploitation of patented products, with little
incentive for the local working of these inventions unless a
particular country would provide some form of comparative
I8 5
advantage.
There also would appear to be relatively little incentive for

invention creators in developed countries to develop inventions at
the technological level required by these countries in their status
as consumers subject to an import monopoly. Hence, it appears
likely these countries will remain consumer countries rather than
productive participants in world trade beyond whatever natural
resources may be exploitable. 18 6 Consequently, in either the
short or long run, it is difficult to foresee that patent TRIPS will
accrue to the benefit of developing countries, especially LDCs,
unless incentives outside the patent system are provided for the
transfer of technology and hence the industrialization of these
countries.

Indeed, the natural rights aspects of inventions may be seen
as eliminating the comparative advantage of those nations that
previously provided no or weak patent protection for particular
classes of inventions. Prior to patent TRIPS, those nations that
did not protect particular classes of subject matter or protected
them only for a short period of time had a comparative advantage
in relation to those nations that did. If patent protection is not
subject to the self-interest of individual countries, why, in the
next round of GATT, should this not be extended to the
elimination of other types of comparative advantage traditionally
87
admitted by positive law?'

185. See supra note 152.
186. Even with respect to natural resources, as summarized by Arnold:
"The extent of Third World resources, therefore, has to be viewed with caution.
Just because a country or region has an abundance of minerals (or one particular
mineral) does not automatically ensure economic prosperity.
Indeed and
perversely, it may produce the reverse." Guy ARNOLD, THE THIRD WORLD HANDBOOK

161 (2d ed. 1994). Factors that result in the reverse include the power of MNCs
in that country and political pressures to raise revenue quickly. Id.
187. To "even the playing field," should minimum comparable wage and
environmental standards be imposed? Should tax or other incentives (e.g., for
exploration for natural resources or for research and development) be eliminated?
This is to say nothing of the problems of agricultural subsidies as a perennial
point of contention among developed countries.

See NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra

note 34, at 127-254 (discussing historical background, negotiations during
Uruguay Round, and including an extensive bibliography on the problem of
agricultural subsidies).
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B. Strategies
Some strategies for coping with patent TRIPS may be
suggested to those countries impacted by them. Such strategies
are primarily based on existing practices within various developed
countries or on specific provisions of TRIPS. These suggestions
are offered, however, with the caveat that an overzealous
application or extension of any of these suggestions may result in
complaints of noncompliance with TRIPS, thus evoking the
dispute resolution mechanisms under the Agreement or resulting
in bilateral pressures being applied by developed countries at the
instance of patent owning enterprises. 18 8 Nonetheless, some of
these suggestions may mitigate certain perceived adverse
consequences of the implementation of patent TRIPS, particularly
within developing countries and LDCs.
One suggestion would be to establish a fee for patent
acquisition at a level adequate to completely fund the patentgranting agency in the country. Indeed, countries might follow

the example of the United States to add a surcharge to fees,

making them adequate not only to provide for a self-financing
which can then be used
agency but also to generate excess 8funds,
9
for other governmental functions. 1

188. See Oddi, International Patent System, supra note 108, at 873-75
(discussing the potential repercussions from straying too far from the norms of
conduct expected of third world countries).
189. A surcharge was imposed on U.S. Patent and Trademark Office fees
under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (PL 101-508). Congress
must approve any expenditure from this fund. See 35 U.S.C. § 42(e) (Supp.
1993). Since the inception of the surcharge, Congress has diverted an estimated
$60 million, and this is expected to increase and continue with the surcharge
being extended until 2002. See Judiciary Votes Along Party Lines to Extend
Surchargeon PatentFees. 50 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 559-60 (BNA 1995).
It may be anticipated that for those developing countries that are members of
the Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231
(amended Oct. 2, 1979 and modified Feb. 3, 1984) a majority of applications will
originate as international applications filed under the Treaty with developing
countries being designated states. Nonetheless, the suggestions made herein
may be effected to the extent possible within the national procedure after the
application is transmitted to the respective designated offices. Note that national
fees may be imposed. See Id. art. 22. See also Id. art. 27 5:
Nothing in this Treaty and the Regulations is intended to be construed as
prescribing anything that would limit the freedom of each Contracting
State to prescribe such substantive conditions of patentability as it
desires. In particular, any provision in this Treaty and the Regulations
concerning the definition of prior art is exclusively for the purposes of the
international procedure and, consequently, any Contracting State is free to
apply, when determining the patentability of an invention claimed in an
international application, the criteria of its national law in respect of prior
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Those industries that benefit most from the patent system in
a given country might be expected to pay in accordance with the
benefits afforded to them. For example, fees could be based upon
the worldwide assets of multinational corporations seeking patent
protection in the country. Alternatively, or in addition to an
assets approach, fees may be based upon the subject matter of
patent applications. Thus, pharmaceutical, agricultural chemical,
and semiconductor inventions may be required to pay augmented
fees. Such an asset or subject-matter-based fee system would not
be contrary to the national treatment requirement of TRIPS, the
Paris Convention, or the Berne Convention, because domestic
corporations would be treated the same as foreign ones.1 9 0 Of
course, as the vast majority of patent applications in developing
countries are filed by foreign enterprises, the impact would fall
upon the actual beneficiaries of the system. 19 1
Also, countries may charge a multiplicity of fees. 19 2 In

addition to filing fees should be examination fees, search fees,

reexamination fees, issuance fees, etc. Moreover, maintenance
fees on a periodic basis, even yearly, would seem desirable. A set
fee for all patents could be established, which could then be
augmented by an additional fee based on a percentage of the
domestic sales of the patented invention.193

art and other conditions of patentability not constituting requirements as
to the form and contents of applications.
Id. However desirable fees may be, many LDCs. of course, do not have
functioning patent offlices. See Evenson, supra note 181, at 361 (indicating that
about 60 to 70 LDCs have essentially no Intellectual property systems).
190. Domestic subsidiaries of MNCs could be treated as domestic
corporations for the purposes of fees if this would serve as an Incentive to
establish a domestic subsidiary or related enterprise.
191. A 1974 study of the United States Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) found that no more than 1% of patents granted In
developing countries were owned by their nationals. See U.N. DEP'T OF EcON. &
Soc. AFF., UNCTAD SECRETARIAT AND INT'L BUREAU OF THE WVIPO. THE ROLE OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM IN THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 92, U.N.

Doc. TD/B/AC.11/19 (1974). In 1984, according to statistics collected by WIPO,
approximately 90% of patents granted in developing countries that are members
of the Paris Union were granted to foreigners. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION,

INDUSTRIAL

PROPERTY

STATISTICS

8-9,

WVIPO

Doc.

No.

IP/STAT/1984/B (Publication B) (1985). The most recent statistics Indicate no
significant change. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY STATISTICS 1-9, WIPO Doc. IP/STAT/1993/A (Publication A) (1993).
192. The U.S. model may be useful. See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1988), which
imposes fees for. Inter alla, filing, issue, disclaimer, filing appeal, brief and oral
hearing, revival of abandoned application, extensions, national fee for
international application, maintenance, recording, photocopies, and patent

copies.
193. The problem with this approach Is, of course, that the patent owners
will, If competition permits, pass on the augmented fees to the consumers. Thus,
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Revenues received in excess of the cost of operating the
patent office could thus be used for any other governmental
functions or deficit reduction; however, it might be politic to apply
the excess to technical education, industrial development, or
related activities.
Another suggestion is based upon a requirement of Article 29
of patent TRIPS obligating members to require that applicants for
a patent "disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and
complete for invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the
art and may require the applicant to indicate the best mode for
carrying out the invention." 19 4 The enabling requirement is, of
course, boilerplate in most patent statutes. x9 5
However,
developing countries in particular should take this requirement

seriously and should insist upon a complete disclosure, which will
enable the making of the invention in that particular developing
country.

Hence,

mere translations of patent

applications

as

originally fied in other countries should not be automatically

accepted. 19 6 The statutory requirements for enabling disclosure
could be quite specific in requiring specifications, blueprints,
dimensions,
chemical
compositions,
exact
temperatures,
pressures, bill of materials, equipment requirements, etc.
Impacted countries could impose the optional "best mode"
requirement with the clear understanding that the disclosure
should be of the best mode of making and using the invention in

some differentiation would seem advisable, for example, between inventions on
luxury items and those related to essentials.
194.
TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 29 (Conditions on Patent Applicants):
1. Members shall require that an applicant for a patent shall
disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the
invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art and may require
the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention
known to the inventor at the filing date or, where priority is claimed, at the
priority date of the application.
195.

Article 29 essentially tracks 35 U.S.C. § 112

1 (1988):

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and
use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his [or her] invention.
TRIPS, supra note 6. art. 29.
196. Cf. Herbert Stumpf, Interests and Conflicts of Interest In Technology
Transfer: The Role of Patents, 9 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 309, 315
(1978)(claiming that translation into the language of the developing country to be
one of the major advantages to their grant of patents).
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that country while taking into account the availability of
197
equipment, components, materials, etc.
Another suggestion for impacted countries would be to adopt
a Japanese model of patent prosecution and scope of
protection. 198 The patent prosecution should be made as complex
and lengthy as possible to ensure formal compliance with the
patent statute and, moreover, ensure scrupulous compliance with
the enabling requirement, as discussed supra. Extending the
pendency period of a patent would accordingly cut into its
duration, which is mandated by Article 33 to run from the filing
19 9
date in that country.
In order to quickly disseminate the technological information
contained within the patent application, the application should be
There is no
published as soon as possible after filing.
requirement that the application not be published, as is the
current practice in the United States, or only after an extended
period, such as eighteen months after filing, which is the practice
20 0
in many countries.

An opposition procedure may also be implemented so that
any interested parties may oppose the grant of this particular
application. 2 0 '

This has

the advantage

of having interested

parties provide the best prior art and also augmenting the
technological search capability of the domestic patent office.
A high standard of patentability should be adopted to ensure
that mere detail patents of the type that tend to be market-

197.
While the "best mode" requirement under § 112 is generally construed
as being a subjective standard (See 2 CHISUM. supra note 167, § 7.0511]), there is
no reason why inventors seeking patents in a particular country should not be
required to disclose what they would consider to be the best mode in that
country, rather than in the country of origin.
198.
See supra note 136.
199. Adhering to this suggestion too vigorously could, of course, result in
repercussions. For example, in response to pressure from the United States,
Japan has agreed to permit fiing of applications in English and to permit
correction of translation errors during prosecution and after grant. In addition,
Japan has agreed to eliminate pre-grant oppositions. In return, the United States
agreed to a 20-year term from the filing date and to publication of applications 18
months after filing and to expand re-examination procedures. See U.S. Says "Not
Now" on First-to-Fileand Agrees with Japan on Patent Term, 47 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. 285, 285-86 (BNA 1994); U.S. Japan Conclude Agreement on
Reexamination and Publication, 48 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 412, 412-14
(BNA 1994). The 20-year term has already been implemented under patent
TRIPS. Bills have been introduced for publication (H.R. 1733) and for expanding
re-examination (H.R. 1732).
200. See 2 BAXTER ET AL., supra note 102, § 5.01 (listing publication dates of
applications, with 18 months from filing being a common time, including that of
the European Patent Office).
201. See id. §§ 14.01-14.04 (summarizing the procedures employed by
countries having oppositions).
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induced rather than truly revolutionary or basic inventions are
not granted. Article 27, after all, imposes a Western standard for
patentability. 20 2 Patent offices within impacted countries should

demand the search results from corresponding applications as
generated by the major patent offices of the world as authorized
by Article 29, paragraph 2, and use these results as a guide for
disposition. 20 3 However, the mere fact that a patent had been
granted on an analogous patent application in another country
of whether or not a patent should be
should not be determinative
20 4
granted in this country.
Care should be taken not to equate the enabling standard of
a person skilled in the act in this country with the
"nonobviousness" or "inventive step" substantive requirement. An
impacted country could base its substantive standard for the
grant of a patent on whether the claimed invention would be
nonobvious
to a person skilled in that art anywhere in the
20 5
world.
Further, it is suggested that a pre-grant opposition procedure
be implemented, thus providing competitors with an opportunity
Post-grant
to oppose the grant of the particular claims. 20 6
challenges to the patent and re-examination procedures would
also be suggested. 20 7 Of course, appropriate fees should be
imposed in order to fully underwrite all of the procedural steps
involved in the grant and post-grant periods.

202. Cf. TRIPS, supra note 6. art. 27 with 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103
(1994). art. 52 of the European Patent Convention of 5 October 1973 (as
amended) (inventions must be "susceptible of industrial application, which are
new and which involve an inventive step") and arts. 54-55 (novelty) and art. 56

(defining "inventive step" in terms of nonobviousness), reprinted In 2K JOHN P.
SINNOTT, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 30-32 (1994).
203. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 29(2) ("Members may require an applicant for
a patent to provide information concerning [the applicant's] corresponding foreign
applications and grants.").
204. The Paris Convention, supra note 26, art. 4, after all, mandates the
independence of patents. Thus, invalidating a patent in one country does not
automatically invalidate the corresponding patent in another. Id. art. 4 1 2. The
same should follow for the independence in granting.
205. What may be nonobvous in a developing country because of its
relatively low level of technological development may be obvious to one skilled in
the art in a developed country.
206. For example, in Japan, a two-month period after publication Is
provided when "any person" may file an opposition to the grant of a patent. See
The Patent Law and the Enforcement Law Thereof, Law No. 121, Apr. 13, 1959 (as
amended) arts. 55-65, reprinted in 2F JOHN P. SINNOTT & WILLIAM J. COTREAU,
WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 28.1-30 (Japan) (1995).
207. An example is the re-examination procedure in the United States. 35
U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (1988).
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A statutory provision should be included in the patent acts of
impacted countries to establish a narrow scope of protection.
Accordingly,

there

should

be

a

very

limited

doctrine

equivalents, and claims should be interpreted narrowly. 20 8

of

This

essentially follows the Japanese model and, when coupled with
early publication of the application, enables competitors to fie for
patents on improvements on the published invention. 20 9 Thus,
competition among the various entities for improvements on the
basic invention will be engendered, and any improvement patents
issued will be limited to a narrow scope.
A procedure for dealing with "blocking patents" should be
established. Thus, when a basic patent would otherwise block an
improvement patent, some form of compulsory licensing system
should be available, such as indicated in Article 31(l) of patent
TRIPS. 2 10 Such a procedure would aid access to the improvement

in the country.
Another suggestion is that impacted countries adopt a
worldwide exhaustion doctrine, building upon the model of the
European Union. 2 1 ' Under a worldwide exhaustion doctrine, any
patented product sold by or with the authorization of the patent
owner may be imported into the country without regard to
whether that particular product is patented in that country.
Thus, the first authorized sale anywhere removes any fences from
the product, and it may be freely imported into the country. This

208.

This would avoid the problems that the United States in particular has

had with the doctrine of equivalents. See generally, CHISUM, supra note 167, §
18.04.
209.

See supra note 136 (Japanese practice).

210. Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter
of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by
the government or third parties authorized by the government, the
following provisions shall be respected:
(1)where such use is authorized to permit the exploitation of a patent ("the
second patent") which cannot be exploited without infringing another
patent ("the first patent"), the following additional conditions shall apply:
(I)
the invention claimed in the second patent shall involve an
important technical advance of considerable economic significance in
relation to the invention claimed in the first patent;
(ii)
the owner of the first patent shall be entitled to a crosslicense on reasonable terms to use the invention claimed in the
second patent; and
(iii)
the use authorized in respect of the first patent shall be
non-assignable except with the assignment of the second patent.
TRIPS, supra note 6. art. 31.
211.
See supra note 167. See also Judgment of Mar. 23, 1995 (Japanese
Auto Prods. Kabushiki Kaisha & Anor. v. BBS Kraftfahrzeug Technik A.G.), K6t6
Saibansho [Tokyo High Court], No. 3272 of 1994 (Japan).
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will permit competition in a particular patented product
manufactured in and exported from various countries throughout
the world with the authorization of the patent owner.
An exception to this exhaustion rule may be considered to the
effect that, if the patented invention is domestically worked,

worldwide exhaustion would not apply.

Hence, the domestic

patent owner or licensee could exclude patented products
originating from other countries as an incentive for local working.
There is a downside to such an exception. The universal adoption
domestic enterprises from
of such a rule could seriously hamper2 12
competing in the international market.
As many impacted countries will serve only as consumers of
patented products, with little or no hope of any actual transfer of
technology and local working of such products, it would seem
appropriate that, at least with respect to products charged with a
national interest (e.g., health, safety, food production, and basic
services), particular controls for foreign imports be imposed
within the GATT framework. Thus, for example, with regard to
pharmaceutical and other medical products, governmental
controls could be established with respect to such products. This
213
certainly is not an unknown model in the developed world.
This may be implemented by price or profit regulation or by
centralized buying based upon competitive bidding for
substantially identical or equivalent products. Such regulation
would avoid dissipation of valuable foreign exchange, and would
tend to neutralize the excessive demand created by extensive
2 14
advertisement and promotional activities.

212. On the other hand, the principal market for domestically produced
products may be in developed countries with the authorization of the patent
owners. who have elected to work particular inventions locally because of
comparative advantages in the developing country.
213. See M. Dickson, The Pricing of Pharmaceuticals: An International
Comparison, 14 CLIN. THER. 603 (Abstract), availablein LEXIS, Medlne Library.
Four types of pricing policies and regulations are recognized: product
price control, as practiced in France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; reference

pricing, as in Germany and the Netherlands; profit control, as in the
United Kingdom; and no control, as in the United States. The system in
Canada is a hybrid of product price control and reference pricing; a
producer may set any price for a new product as long as it Is within
guidelines established by a federal government review board.

Id.
214. Developing countries can thus learn from the various control
mechanisms used in the developed world. See id. The end result should be a
leveling of prices to the world level whether the pharmaceutical is unpatented or
patented. Indeed, it would appear that many developing countries are well along
on the learning curve. See Rapp & Rozek, supra note 149, at 96 (indicating that
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A final general suggestion would be the adoption of measures
that would encourage the transfer of technology to impacted
countries, and hence provide incentives for that transfer and for
the development of technological capability and industrial
One could reduce or eliminate patent
infrastructure.
maintenance fees with respect to patented inventions that involve
transfer of technology to implement local working. To further

strengthen the incentive to work locally, strong trade secret
protection legislation could be adopted by fully implementing
Article 39 of TRIPS. 2 15 One of the arguments against transfer of
technology to developing countries has been the inadequacy of
trade secret protection. 2 16 The legislation could be made specific
to technology transfers as part of a patent licensing arrangement
so as to enjoin the use of any misappropriated trade secrets at
least for the term of the patent protection.
In all likelihood, the competition over technology transfer and
industrialization among developing countries will increase under
the harmonizing effect of TRIPS throughout the world.
Nonetheless, it is still possible for an individual country to provide
augmented incentives by means of its patent system for particular
categories of inventions considered to be of high benefit to that
country. For example, a country having a severe problem with
certain diseases may provide increased incentives with respect to
such as, longer terms,
inventions relating to such diseases,
2 17
reduced fees, and in rem protection.

at least 38 developing countries have adopted some form of price regulation for
pharmaceuticals).
215. See supra note 137 (quoting TRIPS, art. 39).
216. See Oddi, InternationalPatentSystem, supra note 108, at 851-52, 851
n.86. Kitch apparently believes the major problem Is misappropriation of trade
secrets by employees of enterprises in developing countries. See Kitch, Patent
Policy supra note 149, at 175, where he states that "Oddi discusses the trade
secrecy issue, but then dismisses it for reasons that are unclear." Id. at n. 12. In
the author's view, the major problem is that technology owners in developed
countries are unwilling to release trade secrets to enterprises in developing
countries when such countries lack a legal basis, procedure, and remedies
(especially injunctive relief) for the unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets.
Hence, § 7 (Protection of Undisclosed Information) of patent TRIPS is supposed to
solve both problems.
217. See the proposal for a "transfer-of-technology" patent conditioning the
grant of such a patent upon a preexisting foreign patent and the transfer of
adequate know-how to work the claimed invention in the operating country. 2
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO MODEL LAW FOR DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES ON INVENTIONS §§ 601-16, at 82-102, WIPO Publication No. 841(E)
(1980). See also Oddi, International Patent System. supra note 108, at 871-73
(discussing advantages of such a patent to developing countries). See also Oddi,
Beyond Obviousness, supra note 108, at 1137-41 (discussing augmented
protection to be afforded to "revolutionary" patents).

19961

NATURAL RIGHTS

Outside of the intellectual property system, impacted
countries may also follow the lead of developed countries in
providing incentives for establishing industrial facilities in a given
location by providing various subsidies, which may take the form
of real estate, utilities, transportation linkups, tax abatement,
etc. 2 18
These incentives may be necessary to supplement
whatever comparative advantages a particular country may have.

V.

CONCLUSION

One need not get overwrought for the sake of developing
countries under TRIPS and patent TRIPS in particular.
On
balance, membership in GATT may be to their advantage if they
have any capacity for foreign trade. LDCs do not, almost by
definition, have the technological capacity to replicate inventions
of any sophistication and have limited resources to provide a
market for such inventions. Developing countries on the way to

industrialization and NICs in particular can cope with patent
TRIPS. After all, they have taken advantage of a "head start"
during their "piratical" period not unlike the United States and
Japan during corresponding periods of their industrialization.
Moreover, countries with such a technological capability may be
expected to acquire any needed intellectual property rights and
know-how from enterprises in developing countries that find it
economically advantageous to license rather than export. Also
one would have been naive to assume, even with the complete
domestic implementation of patent TRIPS, that there will be
particularly zealous enforcement against local enterprises at the
instance of foreign patent owners or the government itself.
Nor should one be too sanguine about the economic benefit
accruing to developed countries and their enterprises from patent
TRIPS.
Consumers are only worth their salt if they have
disposable income.
Unless patent TRIPS somehow aids the
industrialization of developing countries and leads to their ability
to purchase foreign inventions, patent TRIPS may do little to
expand foreign trade.

218. See Mary Jo Waits & Rick Heffernon, Business Incentives: How to Get
What the Public Pays for. 67 SPECTRUM:
J. STATE GovT. 34 (1994) (listing
safeguards in granting incentives); Charles Mathesian, Romancing the Smoke
Stack, CONGR. Q. (1994) (indicating the rising cost per job created-Nissan plant
in
Tennessee-$ 1,000
per
job
(early
1980s);
Saturn
plant
in
Tennessee-$26,000 per job (1985); Mercedes-Benz plant in Alabama---$200,000
per job (1993)). Not to be outdone, for a Dofasco Steel plant in Kentucky, the
incentives amounted to $350,000 per job.
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Finally, one may be suspect of international trade policy
advanced by the governments of developed countries but initiated
and driven by industry groups even to the extent of special
interest protection for preeminent members of such groups. This
may not amount to "gun boat" diplomacy, but it does smack of
economic imperialism against uppity "pirate" states who deign to
compete by "imitation," which, if not "the very lifeblood of a
competitive economy," 2 19 is at least an aspect of economic
completion. In any event, one can hope that the world has now
been made safe for intellectual property.

219.
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats. Inc., 489 U.S. 141. 146
(1989). See supra note 78 (quoting more fully from the Bonito Boats case).

